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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you want to compare music downloading software and
online music stores that allow you to download music without violating
copyright law. You don’t know a good search term for such a thing, but
you do know the name iTunes and that iTunes is an example of one
such service. You don’t necessarily want Apple’s trademarked product,
iTunes—in fact, you’ve heard that the software has some bugs and takes
over your entire music library. But for lack of a better term, you put
“itunes” in as your search term on Google, an online search engine,
hoping to get some choices. You want to find something like iTunes,
but not iTunes. Under the logic of a number of recent federal appellate
court decisions, however, the only result you should see is Apple’s
iTunes because only Apple is the trademark holder of the term iTunes.1
1 This hypothetical is based in part on the following cases: Playboy Enters. v. Netscape
Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing search engine to be held liable for
third-party advertising displayed in response to trademarked search terms); Horphag Research,
Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that designing website so it would
appear as search result when web user searches using another’s trademarked name is trademark
infringement); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) (same);
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What does this mean for consumers, other businesses, and the future of
trademark law?
The benchmark of trademark infringement in the United States
traditionally has been a demonstration that consumers are likely to be
confused by the use of a similar or identical trademark to identify the
goods or services of another.2 Trademark law in the United States is
primarily a statutory matter governed by the Lanham Act.3 Under the
Lanham Act there can be a finding of trademark infringement or unfair
competition only if a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception is
demonstrated.4
Despite this clear requirement, several courts have held that
defendants can be held liable for trademark infringement absent such a
showing. This has been especially true in decisions involving the
Internet. For example, courts have allowed findings of trademark
infringement and unfair competition simply because a defendant
designed a website so that the website would appear as a search result
when another business’s trademarked term was entered into a search
engine.5 Some courts have also held defendants accountable for selling
or displaying sponsored advertising or pop-up advertisements that are
linked to a search for a trademarked term without requiring a showing
of confusion or in circumstances where any initial confusion is likely to
be quickly remedied.6
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that non-confusing search results that were listed when trademarked term was used as search term
could be basis of trademark infringement).
2 For simplicity, reference to trademark(s) in this article encompasses both trade and service
marks, as well as trade dress.
3 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000). All but a few trademark disputes are now decided
under federal law in federal courts. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.16
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Trademark Review Comm’n, 77 Trademark Rep. 375,
377).
4 See Lanham Act §§ 32(1), 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2000). The requirement
of showing that a use of a mark is likely to confuse, mislead, or deceive is generally short-handed
simply as showing a “likelihood of confusion.”
5 See, e.g., Horphag Research, Inc., 337 F.3d at 1040; Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d at
465; Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1064-66.
6 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that a search engine could be liable for initial confusion created by banner
advertisement appearing on search results page); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory,
Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1393 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing infringement case to go forward
against search engine for selling advertisements on website keyed to trademarked terms); Gov’t
Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Va. 2004) (same) (the district
court subsequently issued an oral ruling granting Google’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law, see Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1387 n.26); cf. 1-800 Contacts,
Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400
(2d Cir. 2005) (holding software company liable under an initial interest confusion theory for
third-party pop-up advertisements); see also Stefanie Olson, Google Loses Trademark Case in
France (Feb. 4, 2005), http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-5564118.html (French courts hold
Google liable for breach of trademark for displaying rival’s ads keyed to search term).
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The basis for these decisions is a court-created doctrine called
“initial interest confusion,” which was first adopted over thirty years
ago and has been vastly expanded in recent years with the advent of the
Internet. Courts have used this doctrine to hold that defendants have
committed trademark infringement even when no one is ever likely to
be confused by the use of the trademark. Instead, courts have allowed
findings of trademark infringement solely on the basis that a consumer
might initially be “interested,” “attracted,” or “distracted” by a
competitor’s, or even a non-competitor’s, product or service.7
The creation and application of the initial interest confusion
doctrine directly contravenes the Lanham Act, the goals underlying
trademark protection, other intellectual property laws, and the First
Amendment. Application of initial interest confusion short-changes
consumers and threatens fair competition. In the iTunes example, why
shouldn’t you be given a choice of other online music stores when you
enter “itunes” into a search? When presented with search results other
than Apple’s iTunes, would you be confused? Certainly not. Might
you be diverted from iTunes to a competitor’s software or music
service? Yes. But providing consumers such choices and allowing
businesses to produce and advertise similar products has traditionally
been considered fair competition. Such competitive practices form the
foundation of our free market economy.
Although trademark law was intended to assist businesses in
identifying and distinguishing their goods from those of others,
trademark law was never meant to give monopoly rights over the use of
marks to trademark holders, especially at the expense of the greater
public good. Application of the initial interest confusion doctrine
prevents comparative advertisements, limits information available to
consumers, and shuts down speech critical of trademark holders and
their products and services. The initial interest confusion doctrine
undermines the free market system under a misguided notion that
competition in and of itself is unfair.
Almost every federal circuit has adopted the initial interest
confusion doctrine,8 and more and more trademark cases are being
7
8

See discussion infra Parts II.A & II.B and note 57.
See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987);
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 294 (3d Cir. 2001);
Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., No. 6:92CV00460, 1992 WL 436279, at *24 (M.D.N.C.
Dec. 1, 1992) (applying initial interest confusion in 4th Circuit); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece,
141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253
(6th Cir. 2003); Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990);
Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2004);
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
The First Circuit has never explicitly adopted initial interest confusion, and has suggested
that trademark infringement should not be found on the basis of confusion that occurs prior to the
time of sale. See Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 376 F.3d 8, 17 n.4 (1st Cir.

2005]

INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION

109

decided on initial interest confusion grounds. Only a handful of courts
have questioned the doctrine, and no court has explicitly rejected it.9
The recent proliferation of initial interest confusion cases is driven
primarily by the development and prominence of the Internet. Prior to
the consideration of trademark infringement online, the initial interest
confusion doctrine only rarely appeared as the basis for finding
trademark infringement—there were fewer than a dozen published cases
relying on the doctrine before 1990.10 In dramatic contrast, between
2004) (not addressing initial interest confusion issue raised below in reversing district court
decision); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000) (declining “to enter
the ‘initial interest confusion’ thicket”); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,
718 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (1st Cir. 1993) (limiting confusion analysis to time of purchase); see also
Benchmark v. Benchmark Builders, Inc., No. CIV. 00-151-PH, 2000 WL 1886570, at *6 (D. Me.
Dec. 29, 2000) (“[T]he First Circuit, while not expressly rejecting the doctrine of initial-interest
confusion, has indicated that confusion must be found likely at point of purchase to be actionable
under Lanham Act.” (citing Astra, 718 F. 2d at 1207)); Northern Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern
Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (D. Mass. 2000) (“[I]nitial confusion . . . is not cognizable
under trademark law in the First Circuit.”); CCBN.com, Inc. v. c-call.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d
106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999) (considering initial confusion irrelevant unless it translates into “actual
confusion in purchasing parties’ products”). But see EMC Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 59 F.
Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D. Mass. 1999) (considering initial interest confusion theory).
The Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, D.C., and Federal circuits have not decided the issue. See,
e.g., Weiss Assocs. v. HRL Assocs., 902 F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Northland Ins. Cos. v.
Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119-20 (D. Minn. 2000) (noting that Eighth Circuit has not yet
decided whether initial interest confusion doctrine applies under Lanham Act).
9 See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc., 232 F.3d at 2 (declining “to enter the ‘initial interest confusion’
thicket”); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d at 1207-08 (limiting confusion analysis to time of
purchase); Weiss Assocs., 902 F.2d at 1549 (declining to consider “initial confusion” theory
referred to by Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in its opinion); see also Netscape Commc’ns
Corp., 354 F.3d at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring) (calling for overruling of circuit precedent
that held that there can be trademark infringement under an initial interest confusion theory
absent likely confusion).
10 Based on a survey of published cases available on the Lexis and Westlaw databases from
1962 until 1990, fewer than a dozen published cases, including those credited with inventing the
doctrine, refer to and rely on a doctrine of “initial confusion,” “initial interest confusion,” or
“initial interest.” See, e.g., First Nationwide Bank v. Nationwide Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 682 F.
Supp. 965, 977 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (citing Pegasus Petroleum, 818 F.2d at 260, for the proposition
that creation of “initial interest” was actionable trademark infringement); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Ross Bicycles, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1336, 1347 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (same) (case depublished and
republished at 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4160), order vacated by 870 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1989);
Pegasus Petroleum, 818 F.2d at 260; Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.
Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1975); Pegasus Petroleum, 229 U.S.P.Q. 890,
894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Television Enter. Network, Inc. v. Entm’t Network, Inc., 630 F. Supp.
244, 247 (D.N.J. 1986); Warehouse Rest., Inc. v. Customs House Rest., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 411,
417 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (considering evidence of “initial confusion” as evidence of “actual
confusion”); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. 634, 640 (N.D.
Cal. 1977), rev’d, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979); Koopers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers Gmbh, 517 F.
Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Blaw-Knox Co. v.
Siegerist, 300 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D. Mo. 1968) (describing initial “interest” caused by “initial
confusion” as possible basis for trademark infringement); cf. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 704 (5th Cir. 1980) (referring to fact that marks might be
“initially” confusing as evidence that trade dress of two marks is similar in design); Commc’ns
Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1251 (4th Cir. 1970) (considering “initial
confusion” between sound of marks as one factor in trademark infringement analysis); Safeway
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1990 and today there have been more than 100 published cases
considering “initial interest confusion.” The expanded application of
initial interest confusion has not, however, been limited to the Internet.
As more and more trademark holders have prevailed using initial
interest confusion arguments in the Internet context and the number of
precedents has grown, the doctrine has been used, and will continue to
be used, with increasing success offline.11
No article to date has questioned the outright validity of the
doctrine from its court-created origins in the 1970s. In fact, a number of
prominent treatise writers and scholars have expressly supported the
doctrine.12 Some articles have questioned the application of the
doctrine in the Internet context, primarily because of the ease of
navigation online, but none have called for the doctrine’s wholesale
rejection both on and offline.13 Prior works that have discussed initial
Stores v. Suburban Foods, 130 F. Supp. 249, 251 (D. Va. 1955) (referring to “initial confusion” in
context of confusion that was initial and not subsequently remedied). There are even fewer cases
if one eliminates duplicative cases involving district court and appellate decisions for the same
case. A number of cases during this time period refer to “initial confusion” (not “initial interest”),
but dismiss it as not being a basis on which trademark infringement can be grounded. See, e.g.,
Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), rev’d on other
grounds, 769 F.2d 362 (6th Cir. 1985); Church of the Larger Fellowship, Unitarian Universalist
v. Conservation Law Found., Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 869, 873 (D. Mass. 1983); Broad. Publ’ns, Inc.
v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 309, 318 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v.
Raytheon Co., 439 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 648
P.2d 393, 395 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting findings of trial court with approval); Pa. Dutch Co.
v. Pa. Amish Co., 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 379, 385 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1974).
11 See, e.g, Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry Creations, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11295, 2003 WL
21056809, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003); Shell Trademark Mgmt. BV v. Canadian Am. Oil Co.,
No. 02-01365, 2002 WL 32104586, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2002).
12 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS §§ 23:5, 23:6, 25:69, 25:76 (4th
ed. 2005) (supporting initial interest confusion generally and Brookfield’s holding that allowed
trademark infringement when there was no likelihood of confusion); James A. Rossi, Protection
For Trademark Owners: The Ultimate System of Regulating Search Engine Results, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 295, 327 (2002) (“applaud[ing]” adoption of initial interest confusion as a
solution to online use of trademarks); J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters and
Domain Names, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 231, 235-36 (2000) (supporting the
initial interest confusion doctrine and taking credit for its application to the Internet) [hereinafter
McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters]; Stanley U. Paylago, Trademark Infringement,
Metatags, and the Initial Interest Confusion Remedy, 9 FALL MEDIA L. & POL’Y 49, 64-65 (2000)
(supporting application of initial interest confusion online); Note, Confusion in Cyberspace:
Defending and Recalibrating The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2387,
2410 (2004) (supporting the initial interest confusion doctrine, but suggesting that it should be
limited online to competitive situations involving intentional deception); Rachel Jane Posner,
Note, Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439, 505 (2000) (urging all courts to adopt initial interest confusion);
see also Promatek Indus., Ltd., v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (Judge
Posner, a noted scholar, joins a decision that endorses initial interest confusion).
13 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY
L.J. 507 (2005) (recent article criticizing logic of initial interest confusion in context of discussion
about online searches, but leaving unaddressed broader application of initial interest confusion);
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 785, 815, 819-23 (2004) (criticizing recent cases applying initial interest
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interest confusion, even those that have been critical of it, have also
failed to fully consider the motives for adopting the doctrine and,
therefore, have not provided a useful framework for reform.
Reformulating the initial interest confusion doctrine is more than
simply an issue of statutory interpretation. In recent years, much of the
expansion of trademark and other intellectual property laws stems from
Congressional legislation at the behest of trade groups or corporations,
representing the most powerful intellectual property holders, at the
expense of smaller competitors and the public.14 Thus, even if courts
back away from the erroneous initial interest confusion doctrine,
Congress may nevertheless be encouraged to codify it. It therefore is
vitally important to understand why the doctrine is wrong as a matter of
policy and why it represents an assault on the fundamental principles of
trademark law.
Determining the scope and validity of initial interest confusion
requires consideration of a number of larger theoretical issues facing
trademark law today. The first is whether it is ever acceptable to trade
off of the goodwill established by another. Some have termed this the
“free-rider” problem and have suggested that if a company builds up
value in a particular product or service then no one else should be able
to benefit from that accumulated value. While initially appealing when
framed in those terms, such a conclusion is short-sighted and, as I will
discuss in more detail, contradicts long-standing trademark law
principles. Consider the role the company Federal Express (now
FedEx) played in building a market for overnight shipping. The word
“FedEx” has now become a common verb or shorthand for speedy
delivery services even when consumers use other shippers. Should
FedEx be able to prevent others from establishing their own overnight

confusion to Internet but supporting application of doctrine more broadly as “an occasionally
useful lens for assessing traditional infringement and unfair competition claims” when considered
within broader likelihood of confusion analysis); David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer,
Reconsidering Initial Interest Confusion on the Internet, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1035, 1064-65
(2003) (supporting application of initial interest confusion offline but not online); Lisa M.
Sharrock, Realigning the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine With the Lanham Act, 25 WHITTIER
L. REV. 53, 73 (2003) (criticizing recent expansion of initial interest confusion, especially as
applied to Internet, but concluding that “there exists a host of potential fact patterns for which the
initial interest confusion doctrine is an appropriate vehicle of analysis” when limited to
circumstances in which ultimate purchasing decision is affected); Erlend Bakken, Unauthorized
Use of Another’s Trademark On the Internet, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3 (2003) (limiting
criticism of initial interest confusion to Internet context); Bryce J. Maynard, Note, The Initial
Interest Confusion Doctrine and Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1303 (2000) (same); Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: What Ever
Happened to Traditional Likelihood of Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 643 (2002-2003)
(same).
14 Consider the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127
(2000), the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298 §§ 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-28
(1998), and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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delivery services simply because it had the idea first and built up a
market for such services? Should competing services not be able to
contrast themselves to FedEx but rather be required to operate in a
vacuum, leaving consumers in the dark as to how the different services
compare?
Initial interest confusion raises another pivotal question for
trademark law—what is the ultimate role of trademark protection? Do
trademark infringement and unfair competition actions under the
Lanham Act serve primarily to protect consumers from being duped by
unethical competitors, or do the actions primarily serve to shore up the
business of individual trademark holders without regard to the best
interests of consumers? The recent expansion of the scope of trademark
protection suggests a focus on protecting businesses, but the genesis of
trademark law in the United States strongly suggests that consumers
were also at the heart of the decision to provide legal protection for
trademarks.
The answer to these questions is tied up with an even more
fundamental ontological question about intellectual property law: Are
trademarks and trademark infringement actions about protecting
property rights or are they about providing more limited rights akin to
tort and unfair competition actions? The resolution of this issue
provides a conceptual framework for determining the legitimacy of both
expansions and limits to the scope of trademark protection and will
determine the shape and direction of trademark law in the twenty-first
century.
The future of initial interest confusion will also determine what the
world of Internet commerce looks like. The Lanham Act allows ecommerce to look like a supermarket, providing consumers with a
wealth of choices and product information. When you enter a
supermarket you might, for example, ask a clerk where you can find
Grey Poupon. You will then be directed to an aisle filled with many
brands and types of mustard, as well as ketchup and other condiments.
Once there, you might find yourself distracted, or attracted, to some
other items, including some other brands of mustard. You might notice
a generic “Dominick’s” or “Safeway” brand mustard that’s half the
price of Grey Poupon. You might notice an imported mustard that’s
twice the price of Grey Poupon but strikes your fancy.15 You might
well leave the supermarket with something besides Grey Poupon, but
you would not do so because of any confusion. When applying initial
interest confusion analysis, courts are deciding that Internet consumers
should not have such choices.

15

Inc.

Grey Poupon, despite the French name, is produced in the United States by Kraft Foods,
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But it is not just online businesses and consumers who are affected.
If the doctrine of initial interest confusion is left unchecked, it will
certainly alter the offline world as well. Competitors will not be able to
compare their products with other businesses’ trademarked goods or
services; companies that repair trademarked products or resell
trademarked goods will not be able to advertise or perhaps even inform
customers of their services. At the extreme, supermarkets could be
required to organize their aisles alphabetically by trademark name,
rather than by category of product. Imagine a world in which you want
to find raisin bran and need to decide in advance whether you want
Kellogg’s or Post’s and then must look in the “K” aisle before Kleenex
tissues and Kraft macaroni and cheese if you decide on Kellogg’s.
This Article provides a wake-up call to courts, Congress, the online
and offline business communities, and the public. Initial interest
confusion must be revisited and replaced. In Part I of the Article, I
briefly review the origins of initial interest confusion, and the few most
important cases from which it developed. This background provides an
important foundation for analyzing the vast expansion of the doctrine in
recent years and the problems that accompany it.
Part II of the Article examines the current and foreseeable
problems caused by the adoption and application of the initial interest
confusion doctrine. This part focuses on the doctrine’s conflict with
basic trademark and unfair competition principles, other intellectual
property laws, and the First Amendment.
Part III considers the motivation behind the courts’ creation and
expansion of the doctrine. The courts’ initial motivation for adopting
initial interest confusion was a legitimate effort to prevent baiting and
switching practices. However, since then courts have unreasonably
stretched the doctrine to cover many circumstances which should be
considered fair competition or which are better addressed by other
existing statutes.
Part IV explains why both the statutory and nominative fair use
defenses do not provide an adequate remedy to the dangers created by
the application of the initial interest confusion doctrine.
Part V presents a proposal to replace the initial interest confusion
doctrine with a narrower consideration of “pre-sale confusion.” The
mere diversion of a consumer to another product or service should not
be used as a basis to find trademark infringement or unfair competition.
Pre-sale confusion must entail proof of likely confusion that is more
than de minimis, must be limited to potential purchasers, and must
consider the complete array of factors traditionally examined in the
likelihood of confusion analysis. Finally, I discuss possible structural
changes to the World Wide Web (the “Web”), and in particular to
search engines, that will remedy some of the most vexing Internet-based
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problems that courts have tried to address by relying on the misguided
initial interest confusion doctrine.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION
While it is not necessary or particularly useful to catalogue every
initial interest confusion case, there are three primary cases that are
worth analyzing in some detail because they highlight the logic behind
the adoption of the doctrine and trace the doctrine’s expansion.
A.

Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.
Steinway & Sons

Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway &
Sons16 is a Second Circuit case often credited with coining the term
“initial interest confusion.”17 In Grotrian, a dispute arose from the use
of the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name on pianos imported from Germany
and sold in the United States. The plaintiff, Steinway & Sons,
contended that the mark infringed its Steinway mark for pianos.18 The
case’s complexity stems from the fact that the Grotrian-Steinweg pianos
had a historical relationship with the Steinway pianos. In 1835,
Heinrich E. Steinweg, the founder of Steinway & Sons, began making
pianos in Germany under the name Steinweg. In 1850 he emigrated to
New York, changed his name to Steinway and began selling pianos
under the name Steinway & Sons. His oldest son, C.F. Theodor
Steinweg, remained in Germany and continued making pianos under the
Steinweg name. In 1866, Theodor sold his business to his three
employees, Wilhelm Grotrian, Adolph Helfferich and H. G. W. Schultz,
and moved to the United States to join his father at Steinway & Sons.
As part of the sale of the piano business to Grotrian et al., Theodor gave
his successors the right to use the name “Steinweg.”19 The new owners
16
17

523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
Neither the circuit court nor the district court used the term “initial interest confusion.”
Instead, the district court referred to “initial interest” and the appellate court referred to both
“initial interest” and “initial confusion.” See id. at 1341-42; Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Blaw-Knox Co. v. Siegerist, 300 F. Supp. 507, 513 (E.D. Mo. 1968), aff’d,
414 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1969), the court used the term “initial confusion” prior to Grotrian and
discussed the unfairness of using initial confusion, even if ultimately remedied, to divert business
away from a plaintiff. Although the analysis of Blaw-Knox is similar to Grotrian and later initial
interest cases, it is rarely cited and did not use the term “initial interest.”
18 Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1334.
19 Id. at 1333-34. The name of the Steinweg company was eventually changed to “Grotrian,
Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf,” which was the name of the company at the time of the
litigation. There was a dispute over whether the right to use the name Steinweg was limited to
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of Steinweg sold their pianos in Germany under the “GrotrianSteinweg” mark.20
When Grotrian began selling pianos under the Grotrian-Steinweg
mark in the United States, Steinway & Sons threatened to sue for
trademark infringement.21 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that even though there was no confusion as to who manufactured the
piano at the time of sale, a customer might initially think there was
some relationship between Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway & Sons.22
The court was confident that consumers would not be confused at the
time of purchase because piano purchasers were highly sophisticated,
the product very expensive, and the appearance of the marks in context
quite different.23 Nevertheless, both the district court and the Second
Circuit concluded that Grotrian had infringed Steinway’s trademark
because people would be more likely to buy the Grotrian-Steinweg
piano under the logic that Grotrian would be afforded credibility early
in the transaction as a result of a consumer’s positive mental
“association” with “Steinway.”24 The district court found that Grotrian
had committed trademark infringement because consumers were
“[m]isled into an initial interest” in the Grotrian-Steinweg pianos
because of “subliminal confusion” as to the companies’ relationship.25
The Second Circuit adopted similar language in affirming the district
court’s opinion:
The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a
Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway. . . . The
harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing
the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name and thinking it had some connection
with “Steinway,” would consider it on that basis. The “GrotrianSteinweg” name therefore would attract potential customers based
on the reputation built up by Steinway . . . . The harm to Steinway in
short is the likelihood that potential piano purchasers will think that
there is some connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and
Steinway pianos. Such initial confusion works an injury to
Steinway.26

ten years or was an unlimited grant. Id. at 1334 & n.2. For purposes of this discussion, I will
assume that it was an unlimited grant of use of the name because the court did not resolve that
issue in holding that the use was infringing.
20 Id. at 1334.
21 The history of the litigation is quite complex and spans nearly fifty years. Grotrian
ultimately brought a declaratory action that went to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to
establish its right to use the Grotrian-Steinweg name. Id. at 1334-35.
22 Id. at 1339-42.
23 Id. at 1337-42.
24 Id. at 1340.
25 Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (emphasis added).
26 Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1342 (emphasis added).
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The holding in Grotrian opened the door to finding trademark
infringement in circumstances where there was no likely confusion and
consumers merely became interested in a product because of an
association with or reference to another’s trademark. The court could
have relied solely on the likelihood of confusion prior to the time of sale
as a basis for its holding, but instead used language that greatly
expanded the possible grounds for a finding of trademark infringement.
The court’s ultimate decision makes sense if there was likely confusion
as to whether there was some business affiliation or sponsorship of the
Grotrian-Steinweg pianos by Steinway, but it is incorrect to the extent it
prevented accurate statements about the historical link between the two
companies from being made. This troubling aspect of the holding has
led to the odd situation today in which the German Grotrian-Steinweg
website accurately describes the history of the company and its
connection with the Steinway family, while the English language
version of the site does not refer to this truthful information, presumably
to avoid liability for causing initial interest confusion.27
B.

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.

The initial interest confusion doctrine did not gain much of a
following in the years after Grotrian. To the extent that the initial
interest confusion holding from Grotrian was cited, it was primarily
confined to courts within the Second Circuit.28 The next significant
case to rely on initial interest confusion is Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp.29 This Second Circuit decision has been widely cited
to support the doctrine. In Pegasus Petroleum, the defendant company,
Pegasus Petroleum, owned by Gregory Callimanopulos, was held liable
27 Compare Grotrian Pianos, http://www.grotrian.de/grotrian_d/html/mehr/firma_mehr.htm
(last visited Aug. 25, 2005), with Grotrian Pianos, www.grotrian.de/grotrian_e/html/mehr/
firma_mehr.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
28 See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir.
1986) (citing Grotrian to support finding of post-sale confusion as basis for infringement); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 229 U.S.P.Q. 890, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (relying on
initial interest confusion doctrine from Grotrian); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop,
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Grotrian for proposition that attraction
to competitor is basis for trademark infringement action); Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of
Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Grotrian for proposition that
consumers do not need to be confused at time of purchase for there to be trademark
infringement); West & Company, Inc. v. Arica Institute, Inc., 194 U.S.P.Q. 32, 36 n.15 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (citing Grotrian for proposition that confusion is actionable even if resolved by time of
purchase). One case to apply Grotrian’s initial interest confusion doctrine outside the Second
Circuit early on was Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1981), in
which a district court in the Third Circuit cited Grotrian for the proposition that “subliminal
confusion” is actionable. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
29 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
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by the Second Circuit on initial interest confusion grounds for
infringing Mobil Oil’s flying horse and other trademarks by adopting
the name Pegasus Petroleum for his oil trading business. After
launching his business, Callimanopulos sent a letter to 400-500 people
in the oil trading business informing them about Pegasus Petroleum and
stating that the company was part of the “Callimanopulos group of
companies.”30 Pegasus Petroleum never used a flying horse symbol
similar to Mobil’s familiar logo. Instead, Pegasus Petroleum used an
interlocking double P as its logo.31
The Second Circuit held that even though there was no chance that
consumers would be confused at the time of purchasing the oil, Pegasus
had committed trademark infringement because it was likely that
“Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial credibility during the initial
phases of a deal. For example, an oil trader might listen to a cold phone
call from Pegasus Petroleum . . . when otherwise he might not, because
of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil.”32
The decision in Pegasus may ultimately have been correct under
the Lanham Act, not because of initial interest, but because Mobil had a
trademark both in the flying horse symbol and in the name Pegasus for
Mobil’s oil business. Because of the similarity of the marks, confusion
may have been likely under the traditional likelihood of confusion
analysis.33
C.

Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment

Despite the development of the initial interest confusion doctrine in
Grotrian and Pegasus Petroleum, few cases relied on the doctrine until
the mid-to-late 1990s, and most of those that did still required a
defendant to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. In total, fewer than
a dozen cases applied initial interest confusion until the 1990s.34 The
rarely-used doctrine was resurrected and greatly expanded in Brookfield
In
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.35
Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit embraced the initial interest confusion
analysis from Grotrian and Pegasus Petroleum, and explicitly held that
the initial interest confusion doctrine could be used to find trademark
infringement even if there is no likelihood of confusion. The holding in
30
31
32
33

Id. at 258.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
Pegasus actually predates Mobil as the trademark for an early predecessor company of
Mobil.
See Mobil & Pegasus, http://www2.exxonmobil.com/corporate/about/history/
corp_a_h_pegasus.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
34 See supra note 10.
35 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Brookfield ignited a firestorm that has spread the initial interest
confusion doctrine to nearly every federal circuit.36 Many trademark
scholars have expressly approved of Brookfield, including J. Thomas
McCarthy, author of the preeminent treatise in the trademark field.37
The most troubling and often-cited holding from Brookfield is that
the use of another’s trademarked term in the metatags for a website
constitutes trademark infringement. Before diving into the specifics of
Brookfield, a brief digression into the workings of metatags and webbased search engines is necessary. Programmers use source code38 to
construct webpages. The source code of any webpage includes
36 See, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 293
(3d Cir. 2001) (citing Brookfield to support conclusion that initial interest confusion is
actionable); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs. L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 250-58 (6th Cir. 2003)
(same); Promatek Indus., Ltd., v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing
Brookfield to support trademark infringement holding on basis of use of trademarked term in
website’s metatags); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000)
(same); Northern Lights Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115 (D. Mass.
2000) (citing Brookfield to support conclusion that trademark infringement is more likely online
than offline); New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Brookfield to support application of initial interest
confusion to use of another’s trademark in metatags and domain name); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight
Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Brookfield to support
application of initial interest confusion to domain name); BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star
Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 210-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Brookfield with approval but
distinguishing facts at hand); Bayer Corp. v. Custom School Frames, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 503,
509 (E.D. La. 2003) (citing Brookfield to support conclusion that use of trademarked term in
metatags was infringing); Comerica Inc. v. Fifth Third Bankcorp, 282 F. Supp. 2d 557, 573 (E.D.
Mich. 2003) (citing Brookfield for conclusion that there is increased chance of initial interest
confusion on Internet); Shepard’s Co. v. Thomson Corp. ex rel. West Group Div., No. C-3-99318, 1999 WL 777944, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 1999) (citing Brookfield as basis for liability
under initial interest confusion theory); Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238,
1246-47 (D. Minn. 2005) (supporting Brookfield, but allowing for fair use of plaintiff’s trademark
in context of criticism); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (D. Minn.
2000) (citing Brookfield with approval but limiting case’s holding to circumstances in which
defendant stands to benefit financially); Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Nagrom, Inc., 72 U.S.P.Q.2D
1751, 1755 (D. Kan. 2004) (citing Brookfield as basis for liability under initial interest confusion
theory). But see Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-36 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (calling for overruling of Brookfield and its holding that there can
be trademark infringement absent likely confusion).
37 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 25:69, 25:76 (applauding Ninth Circuit for its
decision in Brookfield and taking credit for having laid the framework that the Ninth Circuit
adopted); 3A LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 21:12 (4th ed. 2004) (citing Brookfield without criticism, but suggesting several
exceptions to holding); see also McCarthy, Cybersquatters, supra note 12, at 235-36 (supporting
Brookfield decision and taking credit for the court’s application of initial interest confusion);
Rossi, supra note 12, at 327 (“applaud[ing]” Brookfield); Paylago, supra note 12, at 49
(supporting Brookfield); Posner, supra note 12, at 503 (calling for every court to adopt holding
from Brookfield); Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d at 812 (Judge Posner, a well-known scholar, signing
on to a decision that endorses both initial interest confusion and Brookfield).
38 Source code is the programming language that is initially used by human beings to write
computer programs. Source code is then translated into object code, which contains a series of
“0”s and “1”s that a computer uses to execute the source code. See Webopedia, What is Source
Code?, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/source_code.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
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metatags, which are HTML39 commands that describe the content of a
webpage.40 The most common metatags are description and keyword
metatags, which are used to describe the website and to list keywords
that relate to the site in order to assist search engines in locating the
website. Some search engines use metatags as a way of indexing
material online.41 An average websurfer never sees metatags or the
code of a webpage, although anyone using the web can use the “reveal
codes” command to display the metatags and code for any webpage.42
With this rudimentary background on metatags, I turn to the specifics of
Brookfield.
The plaintiff in Brookfield, Brookfield Communications, created
and marketed software and services for professionals in the
entertainment industry.43 After some success within the film industry
community, Brookfield decided to expand its product to reach a
“broader consumer market” with a new product under the registered
mark “MovieBuff.”44 The MovieBuff software included searchable
databases with movie credits, box office receipts, films in development,
film release schedules, entertainment news, and contact lists with the
names of industry professionals.45 Brookfield began selling its product
online
through
its
websites,
moviebuffonline.com
and
brookfieldcomm.com, and provided a searchable online database under
the “MovieBuff” mark for its subscribers.46

39 Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) is the computer language used to create documents
on the Web.
See Webopedia, What is HTML?, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/
HTML.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
40 A “tag” is “[a] command inserted in a document that specifies how the document, or a
portion of the document, should be formatted. Tags are used by all format specifications that
store documents as text files.” Webopedia, What is Tag?, http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/t/tag.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). Unlike other source code used for a webpage,
metatags describe the content of the page rather than provide the code for the page itself.
41 Some search engines use webcrawler programs to retrieve webpages with metatags that
match search terms entered by users. Others create a list of terms that are considered similar to an
entered term and seek out metatags that are similar to those terms. Many search engines,
however, including the popular Google, do not use metatags as a way to index their search
results. Fewer search engines use metatags today than did at the time Brookfield was decided.
Google, for example, determines the rank of search results based in part on how many other sites
link to that site—a sort of online popularity contest. David Krane, as quoted in David Becker,
Google Caught in Anti-Semitic Flap (Apr. 7, 2004), http://news.com.com/2100-1038_35186012.html; M. Totty, Cat and Mouse: As Google Becomes Web’s Gatekeeper, Sites Fight To
Get In, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A1; see also discussion infra Part III.B.3.b.
42 To “reveal codes” using Internet Explorer, go to the “View” menu and select “Source.”
43 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir.
1999). These software applications allowed film industry professionals to track screenplay
submissions, industry credits, and contacts. Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1042.
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The defendant, West Coast, owns one of the nation’s largest video
rental stores, West Coast Video.47 West Coast had a searchable
entertainment database on its website, westcoastvideo.com.48 The
purpose of the database was to help West Coast’s customers locate
movies to rent.49 West Coast used the word “moviebuff” in the
keyword and description metatags for its website.50 West Coast alleged
that it used the term “moviebuff” in its metatags because its
trademarked slogan was “The Movie Buff’s Movie Store;” West Coast
may also have used the term simply to refer to the generic term for
movie enthusiasts.51 Because of the use of “moviebuff” in West Coast’s
metatags, some search engines listed West Coast Video’s website as a
search result when a user searched for the term “moviebuff.”52
The Ninth Circuit held West Coast liable for trademark
infringement because Brookfield’s “moviebuff” trademark appeared in
the metatags for its website.53 The court admitted that a consumer
reviewing the search results was not likely to be confused. In the
examples of search engine results considered by the court, the link to
West Coast’s website was clearly marked as “westcoastvideo.com” and
was listed further down on the results list than the Brookfield website so
that a person reviewing the “hits” in order would see Brookfield’s
47
48

Id.
Id. at 1042-43, 1059. At the time the complaint was filed, West Coast also had a website at
moviebuff.com. Id. at 1042. Part of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Brookfield involved a dispute
over who had priority over the trademark “moviebuff” and whether West Coast could use
“moviebuff” as part of a domain name for one of its websites. The court ultimately held that it
could not. Id. at 1043. This aspect of the decision relies on some questionable logic, but I focus
my analysis only on the court’s holding regarding West Coast’s use of the trademarked term
“moviebuff” in the metatags for its “www.westcoastvideo.com” website.
49 Id. at 1042-43. In fact, West Coast still includes such a search engine on its website, as do
many other Internet websites. Compare West Coast Video, http://www.westcoastvideo.com (last
visited Aug. 25, 2005), with Hollywood Video, http://www.hollywoodvideo.com (last visited
Aug. 25, 2005), and The Internet Movie Database (IMDb), http://www.imdb.com (last visited
Aug. 25, 2005) (also offering free movie databases).
50 Id. at 1043, 1061. Today the West Coast Video website uses as its metatags the following:
<meta name=“Keywords” content=“movies dvds dvds videos vhs tla video movie
discount reviews hollywood actor actors animation criterion cannes independent film
festival buy movie star sundance films director cinema”> <meta name=“Description”
content=“Videos, movies and DVDs at tlavideo.com. Your online movie source for
independent, international and Hollywood films, discount movies and animation.”>
See West Coast Video, http://www.westcoastvideo.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005). Under the
Ninth Circuit’s logic in Brookfield, suits could be forthcoming from Hollywood Video, Sundance,
and the Cannes Film Festival, among others.
51 No evidence was presented that West Coast included the database for the purpose of
competing with Brookfield’s MovieBuff product. In fact, West Coast claimed to be unaware of
Brookfield’s trademark and product. Id. at 1059.
52 Id. at 1061-62. Because West Coast’s website at the time referred to its trademarked
slogan, “The Movie Buff’s Movie Store,” id. at 1042, some search engines might have
independently pulled up the website regardless of the use of the term “moviebuff” in West
Coast’s metatags.
53 Id. at 1062-66.
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website first.54 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that West Coast
committed trademark infringement by using the term “moviebuff” in its
metatags. The court concluded that even though consumers were never
likely to be confused, a finding of trademark infringement was
appropriate because consumers might be “divert[ed]” to another
website; this diversion might cause Brookfield to lose out on some
business because customers might be satisfied with the free searchable
database available on West Coast’s website.55
The court in Brookfield justified its conclusion, that one could find
trademark infringement absent a showing of likely confusion, on the
basis of the initial interest confusion doctrine:
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers
know they are patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there
is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that, by using
‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for
‘MovieBuff’ to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits from the
goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark.56

The court’s conclusion that such diversion is improper competition
and constitutes trademark infringement is wrong both as a matter of
statutory construction and as a matter of policy for reasons that I will
discuss in more detail in the next section.
The three cases I have discussed trace the initial interest confusion
doctrine’s evolution from “initial confusion” or confusion that occurs
prior to the time of sale, to “initial interest” involving “possible”
confusion, and then to “initial interest” absent any likely confusion.
This progression has created the troubling state of the law in which
defendants can be held liable for trademark infringement absent a
showing of a likelihood of confusion.
II. CRITIQUE OF INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION
Some courts use the term “initial interest confusion” to mean two
different things: (1) confusion prior to the time of sale; and (2) initial
interest regardless of any likely confusion. When used in the latter
circumstances the term “initial interest confusion” is truly a misnomer.
Allowing trademark infringement actions on the basis of confusion
occurring prior to the time of sale is sometimes justifiable under the
Lanham Act and the principles behind trademark law; however,
allowing a finding of trademark infringement when there is no likely
consumer confusion has no basis in the law or policies that support
54
55
56

Id. at 1062-63.
Id. at 1062 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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trademark protection. The bulk of my criticism of initial interest
confusion is directed at the use of the term when there is no finding of
likely confusion, but instead only a finding of initial interest. Allowing
trademark infringement or unfair competition actions in such
circumstances violates the plain language of the Lanham Act,
contravenes the goals and logic behind protecting trademarks, harms
free and fair competition, limits public information and consumer
choices, and violates the First Amendment. Even when initial interest
confusion is applied in circumstances in which there is possible
confusion, the application of the doctrine (as opposed to the traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis) unfairly puts defendants at greater risk
of being found liable for trademark infringement, conflicts with other
intellectual property laws, and in some instances may also violate the
First Amendment. I will address each of these concerns in turn.
A.

Initial Interest Confusion Violates the Lanham Act

Despite the clear requirements of the Lanham Act, courts applying
initial interest confusion in trademark actions have ignored the need to
find a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. Numerous courts
have allowed findings of trademark infringement simply on the basis
that a consumer may be “attracted,” “distracted,” “interested,” or
“diverted” by other choices.57 The finding of trademark infringement in
57 See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th Cir.
2004) (defining initial interest confusion as capturing “initial consumer attention”) (emphasis
added); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
infringement where there was no likely confusion under initial interest confusion theory);
Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing liability
under initial interest confusion theory when consumers are “lured” or “diverted” to another site
regardless of degree or duration of any potential confusion) (emphasis added); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464-66 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding infringement where there
was no likely confusion under initial interest confusion theory); Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v.
Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that initial interest confusion applies
even if “customer is never confused”); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (finding initial interest
confusion when there is no “source confusion” because people might be “divert[ed]” to another
website) (emphasis added); Dr. Seuss Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “initial consumer attention . . . may still be an infringement”)
(emphasis added); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385,
1396 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Brookfield and Netscape for support of proposition that there can
be trademark infringement on the basis of “diverting or capturing the consumer’s initial attention”
even though “the consumer does not experience confusion”) (emphasis added); MontblancSimplo GmbH v. Aurora Due S.r.L., 363 F. Supp. 2d 467, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Initial interest
confusion occurs when a purchaser, while fully aware of the source of the product, is attracted to
the junior user’s product because of the competitor’s use of a mark similar to that held by the
senior user.”) (emphasis added); Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Nagrom, Inc., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1751,
1755 (D. Kan. 2004) (allowing liability for initial interest confusion absent showing of confusion
on the basis of diversion); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 311 F. Supp. 2d
690, 723 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“[T]his doctrine applies where the defendant’s ‘use of another’s
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such circumstances—in which potential purchasers are never likely to
be confused—violates the very statute that gives courts the authority to
enforce federal trademark and unfair competition laws.
The Lanham Act expressly limits trademark infringement and
unfair competition actions to circumstances in which a defendant’s use
of another’s mark, or a colorable imitation of that mark, is “likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”58 The purpose of
the Lanham Act as set forth in Section 45 of the Act is to regulate
“deceptive and misleading use[s]” and to prevent “unfair competition[,]
fraud and deception.”59 Congress recently reaffirmed that the main
trademark . . . is calculated to capture initial consumer attention . . . .’”) (quotations omitted)
(emphasis added); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 493 (S.D.N.Y.
2003), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[I]nitial interest confusion occurs
when potential consumers of one website [are] diverted and distracted to a competing website.”
(quoting Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))) (emphasis added); March
Madness Athletic Assoc., LLC v. Netfire, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 786, 812 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(“[D]iversion of traffic is known as initial interest confusion and can support finding of
trademark infringement.”) (emphasis added); Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry Creations, Inc.,
No. 01 Civ. 11295, 2003 WL 21056809, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003) (finding that being
“initially [] attracted” was sufficient for trademark infringement) (emphasis added); Avlon Indus.
v. Robinson, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ill 2003) (concluding that initial interest confusion
occurs when consumer is “diverted”) (emphasis added); Electropix v. Liberty Livewire Corp.,
178 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (evaluating initial interest confusion based on
attraction not confusion); BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (defining initial interest confusion as trademark infringement based on diversion
and distraction); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding initial interest confusion on basis of diversion rather than confusion); New York
State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns, Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1083 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing initial
interest confusion as situation in which consumer is “diverted to another Web site”) (emphasis
added); Acxiom Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D. Del. 1998) (finding trademark
infringement on basis of “interest” not confusion) (emphasis added); Koppers Co. v. KruppKoppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 844 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (finding likelihood of infringement
based on “subliminal” confusion) (emphasis added); see also Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d
1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2004) (focusing on likelihood of consumers being “diverted” rather than
confused in analysis of sophistication of purchasers and consumer care) (emphasis added); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987) (referring to “initial
interest” as basis for trademark injury); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.
Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1975) (considering “initial interest” and
“subliminal confusion” as basis of trademark infringement) (emphasis added); Pegasus
Petroleum Corp., 229 U.S.P.Q. 890, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (referring to attraction and initial
interest as possible basis for finding trademark infringement); Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 5.6 (viewing 1962 amendment to Lanham
Act as allowing infringement without a finding of confusion).
58 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2000). Courts have held that the likelihood of confusion
requirement is identical under sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act. See Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 27-28 (2003); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780-81 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). Section 43, the federal unfair
competition action, encompasses situations in which there is a “false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact.” 15 U.S.C. §
1125.
59 15 US.C. § 1127 (2000) (emphasis added).
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purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect the public from “confusion and
Diverting consumers through deceit and
deception.”60
misrepresentation is not allowed, but diverting consumers by providing
additional choices is permitted. There is no basis for courts to disregard
this statutory language by allowing trademark actions where there is no
likely confusion.61
B.

Initial Interest Confusion Contravenes Justifications for
Protecting Trademarks

In addition to violating the explicit requirements of the Lanham
Act, application of initial interest confusion analysis undermines the
justifications behind providing legal protection for trademarks.
Statutory and common law protections for trademarks emerged from
limited tort and unfair competition laws—not from a broad property
rights scheme. This difference is crucial because it indicates that there
should be only narrow protection for trademarks. Understanding the
primary reasons for protecting trademarks is useful not only because it
highlights how initial interest confusion contravenes the purposes of
trademark law, but also because it provides guidance as to how to best
address situations in which confusion exists prior to the time of sale.
1.

Justifications for Protecting Trademarks

Trademarks historically served to identify the manufacturer or
sponsor of a good or provider of a service.62 Today, trademarks
60
61

See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5577.
The unambiguous plain language of a statute governs its interpretation. See Park ’N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory construction must begin
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”); Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216
F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Where the statutory language is clear and consistent with the
statutory scheme at issue, the plain language of the statute is conclusive and the judicial inquiry is
at an end.”).
62 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 20 (1942) (“Trade-marks,
indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing
articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other.”); H.R. Rep. No. 76-944, at 3
(1939) (“Trade-marks are merely a convenient way of distinguishing the goods of one trader from
those of another. By furnishing a means of identification, they perpetuate good will, and enable
purchasers, by recognizing the marks, to buy again the goods which have pleased them before.”
(citing McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877))); 100 CONG. REC. S16,546-47 (daily ed.
Nov. 19, 1987) (remarks of Senator DeConcini on Introduction of S. 1883); Trade-mark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 204-05 (1942); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 cmt. b (1938); MCCARTHY, supra note 12,
§§ 3.2-3.9.
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primarily identify goods and services and distinguish them from those
sold and provided by others, without regard to who actually
manufactures them.63 For example, a consumer will recognize that
Kleenex and Puffs are manufactured by different companies, but the
average consumer probably has no idea who the parent companies are
that manufacture either of the brands of tissues. Current trademark law
has also expanded to encompass the indication of sponsorship or
affiliation, as well as of origin.64
The congressional reports preceding the passage of the Lanham
Act emphasize that the goals behind protecting trademarks are “to
protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure
to the business community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by
preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those
who have not. This is the end to which this bill is directed.”65 Although
Congress referred to the goal of protecting businesses by preventing the
“diversion” of business, “diversion” in this context was limited to
diversion caused by deception—primarily the deception caused by

63 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 167 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE];
WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS AND ANALOGOUS
SUBJECTS 1 (1873); see also FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 19, 149-50 (Lawbook Exchange 1999) (1925) (describing
shift from focus on identifying origin of goods to identifying product itself).
In recent years a number of commentators have questioned whether trademarks still
primarily identify products or services. Trademarks have in some instances become the
commodities themselves rather than signifiers of a producer of the good or service, or of the
product itself. For example, the Nike swoosh is valuable separate and apart from the running
shoes that were first marked with the trademarked swoosh. See generally Barton Beebe, The
Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004) (describing evolution of
trademarks from identifying source to identifying products to identifying trademarks themselves);
Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J.
1717 (1999) (same); Hon. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993)
(same) [hereinafter Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 400
(1990) (same).
64 The 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act amended 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) [Lanham Act
§ 43(a)] to provide for a cause of action when the use of a mark, or false or misleading
description or representation of fact, “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause, mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, [or] services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(emphasis added). The expansion to cover confusion as to sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement, however, predates this statutory change. See, e.g., Control Components, Inc. v.
Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 770 (5th Cir. 1980); AMP Inc. v. Foy, 540 F.2d 1181, 1184 (4th Cir.
1976); Stop the Olympic Prison v. U. S. Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1121 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). Trademark infringement actions under section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114,
have also been held to include confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co.
v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 106-07 (4th Cir. 1991); GTE Corp. v. Williams
904 F.2d 536, 539 (10th Cir. 1990).
65 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3 (1945); H.R. REP. NO. 78603, at 3 (1943); H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 20; H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3.
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passing off one’s goods as those of another.66 In particular, Congress
repeatedly highlighted that the Lanham Act had two main purposes:
One [goal] is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it
favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants
to get. [The other goal is to protect a trademark owner’s investment]
of energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product . . .
from [the mark’s] misappropriation by pirates and cheats.67

The first goal is to promote the welfare of consumers by assisting
them to identify the source—and sometimes the affiliation or
sponsorship—of goods and services.68 Trademarks serve to assist
consumers in making intelligent purchasing decisions by distinguishing
products and preventing consumers from being deceived.69 Regulating
the use of marks allows an individual to know that when he purchases a
certain product, he will get the same product, made with the same
ingredients and of the same quality, every time. The use of trademarks
also protects the consumer by allowing him to readily identify the
company or individual responsible for defective or dangerous goods.
Simply put, consumer search costs are lowered when goods can be
easily distinguished.70
66 The House Report leading up to the passage of the Lanham Act stated that “[t]he protection
which is accorded is security against misrepresentation as to the origin of goods, by suppressing
imitations which are calculated to mislead buyers into the belief that the goods of one maker are
those of another.” H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3; see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2; H.R. REP. NO.
78-603, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 19; H.R. REP. NO.76-944, at 2 (“A trade-mark only gives
the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s goodwill against the sale of
another’s product as his.” (citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924))).
67 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 2; H.R.
REP. NO. 79-2283, at 19; H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2; see also S. REP. NO. 100-515 at 4 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580; 79 CONG. REC. 7872 (1946) (statement of Senator
O’Mahoney); 100 CONG. REC. S16,546-47 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1987) (remarks of Senator
DeConcini on Introduction of S. 1883); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 16364 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992); Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982).
68 See 79 CONG. REC. 7872 (statement of Senator O’Mahoney) (“The trade-mark or trade
name is designed to give notice to the public that the commodity to which it is attached is
produced by a particular producer. Thereby the consumer knows that this particular producer is
the one who has produced the material he seeks to buy.”); see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2;
H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 19; H.R. REP.
NO. 76-944, at 3.
69 See H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3; Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854 n.14; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. a (1995); LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 167; Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE. L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) [hereinafter Landes
& Posner, Trademark Law]; BROWNE, supra note 63, at 1185-87; see also supra notes 62, 63, 68.
70 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2 cmt. a, 9 cmt. c (1995);
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 2:5; LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at
166-68, 174; Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 69, at 270, 274-75; A. ALCHIAN &
W.R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION & CONTROL 193

2005]

INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION

127

The second justification for protecting trademarks is to allow
businesses to build their goodwill by encouraging consumers to
recognize and ask for a company’s product by name. A company’s
goodwill is generally thought of as the good feelings and associations
that it has built up in the minds of consumers with regard to its business
or product. Trademarks have often been considered symbols or
signifiers of this goodwill.71 By protecting a business’s goodwill,
trademark law provides incentives for business development and the
continued production of high quality goods and services.72
Nevertheless, the Lanham Act's protection of goodwill is limited in
scope. As the House Report leading up to the passage of the Lanham
Act explains: “A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it
so far as to protect the owner’s goodwill against the sale of another’s
product as his.”73 Although trademark protection has expanded in
recent years to include confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation, its
limited scope remains. The owner of a trademark should be able to
prohibit the sale of another’s product only if the seller suggests that the
product is made by the trademark holder or that it is sponsored by or
affiliated with the trademark holder.
There is also a third, though less-often mentioned, goal of
protecting trademarks—the promotion of “fair competition” by leaving
ample room for businesses to compete.74 Congress considered and
valued the contribution to the marketplace that competing businesses
make and did not intend to shut down such competition by adopting the
Lanham Act. Thus, trademark protection must provide breathing room
for fair competition even at the expense of a trademark holder’s grip on
a particular market.

(2d ed. 1977); Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762
(1989-1999).
71 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2; see also Mishiwaka Rubber &
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S 403, 412-13 (1916); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877); Trade-mark
Cases, 100 U.S 82, 87 (1879).
72 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283, at 1275 (“Trade-marks encourage the
maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which
excellence creates.”); H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 1 cmt. e, 9 cmt. c (1995); LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra
note 63, at 168; Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 69, at 270; Lemley, supra note 69,
at 1688; BROWNE, supra note 63, at 1185-87; Carter, supra note 70, at 762.
73 H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2 (quoting Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)).
74 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1274-75. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
suggests that there are three main goals of modern trademark law: “the trademark owner’s claim
to the benefits of its good will, the interest of consumers in reliable indicia of source and
sponsorship, and the right of other sellers to compete vigorously with the trademark owners in the
marketplace.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. d (1995) (emphasis
added).
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When the use of a mark on a product is confusing, the two primary
trademark goals work in harmony to protect consumers from being
deceived and to shore up a business’s goodwill. But a conflict arises
when promoting consumer welfare harms a business’s competitive
advantage. For example, providing a consumer with more choices is
likely to reduce a company’s market share and may weaken a business’s
goodwill. The history behind the adoption of the Lanham Act suggests
that, when such a conflict arises, courts should favor the interests of the
public over those of individual trademark holders. The most compelling
evidence of this preference for consumers is the simple fact that
Congress chose the standard of likely consumer confusion as the test for
trademark infringement, rather than a test focused on business losses by
a trademark holder.75 The trademark acts and common law that
preceded the passage of the Lanham Act also had consumer deception
as the central test for trademark infringement.76 American trademark
law originated from unfair competition law and the common law action
for deceit.77 Liability under both turned not on business injury, but on
proof that consumers had been or were likely to be deceived.78
75 The drafts of the Lanham Act and the congressional reports leading up to the statute’s
passage stress the requirement that infringement actions be based on a showing of likelihood of
consumer confusion. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333; H.R. REP. NO. 79-219; H.R. REP. NO. 78-603;
H.R. REP. NO. 77-2283; H.R. REP. NO. 76-944; see also Bartholomew Diggins, The Lanham
Trade-Mark Act, 35 GEO. L.J. 147, 150 (1947). The Lanham Act’s focus on consumers is true in
spite of the fact that consumers do not have standing to sue for trademark infringement. See 15
U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). Some courts have also concluded that consumers cannot sue under the
unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Act, section 43, although the explicit language of
the section does not foreclose such suits. Compare Made in USA Foundation v. Phillips Food,
Inc., 365 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2004), and Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, 442 F.2d 686
(2d Cir. 1971), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
76 The Trademark Act of 1870 prevented the registration of marks that were so similar to
other marks as to be “likely to deceive the public.” See Trademark Act, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198
(1870). The Trademark Act of 1876 limited infringement to circumstances in which the use of an
imitative trade-mark was “calculated to deceive the public.” See Trademark Act, 19 Stat. 141
(1876). Many of the provisions of the 1876 act also required a demonstration of the “intent to
defraud.” By the time of the Trademark Act of 1881, very similar language to that which was
ultimately enacted as part of the Lanham Act was used to prevent the registration of marks that
“so nearly resemble[] some other person’s lawful trade-mark as to be likely to cause confusion or
mistake in the mind of the public, or to deceive purchasers.” Trademark Act, ch. 138, 21 Stat.
502 (1881); see also Trademark Act, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 274 (1905) (formerly 15 U.S.C. § 85(b))
(precluding registration if “likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to
deceive purchasers”); Trademark Act, ch. 332, 52 Stat. 638 (1938) (same); McLean, 96 U.S. at
251; BROWNE, supra note 63, at 278.
77 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1275; H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3; H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 3; H.R.
REP. NO. 77-2283, at 20; H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3; CONG. REC. S16,546-47 (daily ed. Nov. 19,
1987) (remarks of Senator DeConcini on Introduction of S. 1883, Trademark Law Revision Act
of 1987); Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003); United Drug Co. v.
Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 778 n.5
(1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. d (1995).
78 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 2:8, 5:2; 23:1; ALTMAN, supra note 37, § 21:2; Robert N.
Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 795 (1997); Diggins, supra note 75, at 148, 157, 190; Carter,
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Moreover, even the second goal of the Lanham Act, the protection
of a business’s goodwill, is ultimately about promoting consumer
welfare. A congressional report leading up to the passage of the
Lanham Act highlights that it is in the “interest of the public that the
businessman be protected in his reputation, and the consumer against
fraud.”79 By providing incentives for businesses to keep up the quality
of their goods and to improve their products and services, trademark
law ultimately benefits the public.80 This logic can be seen in other
areas of intellectual property. For example, in copyright law, authors
are given property rights in their creative works with the ultimate goal
of providing incentives for creation so that more works will exist for the
public to consume and build upon.81 The scope of an individual’s rights
in his or her work is meant to be narrowly construed and should
theoretically be limited only to protection that is necessary to maximize
public welfare.82 Similarly, trademark protection should be construed
narrowly with an eye on promoting the ultimate public good.
Allowing a finding of trademark infringement on the basis of mere
“initial interest” does not promote any of the goals of trademark law.
One of the greatest dangers of initial interest confusion is that it is often
used to deny consumers access to information about the goods and
services offered by competing sellers. Such information is crucial for
the efficient operation of competitive markets and protects the public’s
ability to choose between reasonably-priced products. Application of
initial interest confusion harms consumers by eliminating such choices
and information without any compensating benefit.
It is also questionable whether non-confusing references to
another’s trademark actually harm a trademark holder’s goodwill. A
business’s goodwill is not likely to be damaged simply by the fact that a

supra note 70, at 765.
79 H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 2 (1939) (emphasis added). The Senate Report accompanying
the Trademark Law Revision Act expressly stated that it sought to “improve the law’s protection
of the public from counterfeiting, confusion, and deception.” S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 1 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5577.
80 San Francisco Arts & Athletics Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987)
(protecting trademarks gives producer incentives to create quality product which “in turn, benefits
the public”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. e (1995).
81 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1994) (“The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1986); Twentieth Century Fox v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975); see also Tasini v. New York Times, 533 U.S. 483, 523 n.20 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
82 Cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (describing need to limit
intellectual property protection in patent context); see also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965) (patent law must be narrowly construed to
limit harms from affording monopoly).
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non-competing, or even a competing, business provides consumers with
other purchase options. Nor is a trademark holder’s goodwill negatively
affected simply because another company refers to its trademarked
product. A trademark holder’s sales may be impacted by such
competition, but consumers’ feelings about the company, and the actual
goodwill of that company are unlikely to be affected. For example, if I
search for an iTunes substitute, I do not think more or less of Apple as a
company or its product simply because there are competing products
that I can choose from. If anything, the fact that the market for such
software and online music is defined by the word “iTunes” reinforces
my positive view of Apple as an inventive, trailblazing company. If a
company causes confusion as to whether it is iTunes by, for example,
calling itself iToons or iMusic, and is a subpar service, the goodwill of
iTunes and Apple might well be affected. But in such an instance the
traditional likelihood of confusion test would protect Apple. When
consumers are not confused, there is no need—even under the
justification of protecting a business’s goodwill—to find trademark
infringement.
2.

Examples of How Initial Interest Confusion Harms
Consumers and Prevents Fair Competition

The following are examples of cases in which application of initial
interest confusion contravenes the justifications for protecting
trademarks. Each scenario highlights a situation in which potential
purchasers, legitimate businesses, and the public at large are worse off
because of the application of initial interest confusion. These cases
highlight many courts’ focus on businesses rather than consumers, a
misguided concern over free-riding, and the treatment of trademarks as
property rights in gross rather than as limited indicators of source.
a.

Direct Competitors

Courts are most likely to find initial interest confusion when the
defendant directly competes with a trademark holder’s business.
Numerous courts have come to view references to another’s trademark
by direct competitors as unfair. Traditionally, businesses that sell
similar or related products have been able to compare their goods to
those of a trademark holder so that consumers can make informed
choices about which product to buy.83 In fact, Congress emphasized the
83

See Charles D. Ossola & Carol Lally, Trademarks, Fair Use, & the First Amendment, 617
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importance of promoting such choices when justifying the basis for
protecting trademarks.84
Not only in Brookfield, but also in several more recent cases,
courts have suggested that a competitor cannot refer to another’s
trademarked product on its website or even have its website and product
appear as a search result when a consumer looks for a trademarked good
online. One such case is Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pelligrini,85 in
which the defendant and the plaintiff both sold unpatented food
supplements made from an extract of pine bark.86 The plaintiff,
Horphag, registered its version of the compound in the United States
under the name “Pycnogenol.” The facts of the case are complicated by
the fact that the defendant alleged that even though Horphag holds the
trademark for Pycnogenol in the United States, that same trademark is
held and has been used for many years in Europe and elsewhere by Dr.
Masquelier and his licensees.87 Dr. Masquelier is the French scientist
who first created the compound.
Horphag allegedly beat Dr.
Masquelier to the U.S. market and laid claim to the Pycnogenol mark.88
Because the mark Pycnogenol was not available in the United States by
the time the International Nutrition Company, Dr. Masquelier’s U.S.
distributor, sought registration of the product, it choose “Masquelier” as
the U.S. trade name.89
The defendant in Horphag, Mr. Garcia, was apparently a licensed
dealer of the Masquelier version of the compound. He sold Masquelier
on his website, which accurately described the origins of Masquelier as
PLI/PAT. 139, 145; August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 1995); Lindy Pen
Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We have recognized that liability for
infringement may not be imposed for using a registered trademark in connection with truthful
comparative advertising.”). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) encourages the use of
comparative advertising. See 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(b) & (c) (2004) (“Commission policy in the area
of comparative advertising encourages the name of, or reference to competitors, but requires
clarity, and, if necessary, disclosure, to avoid deception of the consumer . . . . Comparative
advertising encourages product improvement and innovation and can lead to lower prices in the
marketplace.”).
84 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
85 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003).
86 The supplement is marketed as a natural antioxidant used to prevent or treat heart disease
and strokes.
87 See, e.g, Excerpts of Record at 72, 86-121, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 0156733, 01-55142). The original patent holder and inventor of the product was Dr. Masquelier,
who named his invention Pycnogenol. See U.S. Patent Nos., 3,436,407 (1969) and 4,698,360
(1987). (The patent had expired by the time of the litigation.) In France, Portugal, Austria,
Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Japan, South Korea and numerous other countries
the product is also sold under the trademark Pycnogenol. Excerpts of Record at 86-121, Horphag
Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-56733, 01-55142).
88 Id. at 86-121; see also Appellant’s Brief, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 0156733, 01-55142), 2002 WL 32103403.
89 Excerpts of Record at 86-121, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-56733, 0155142); see also Appellant’s Brief, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-56733, 0155142), 2002 WL 32103403.
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being invented by Dr. Masquelier and sold under the Pycnogenol name
outside the United States. Garcia also accurately described that
Masquelier and Pycnogenol are made of the same compound. Garcia’s
website clearly identified that it was not associated with the trademark
holder, Horphag, or with Horphag’s trade brand product, Pycnogenol.90
In addition to referring to Pycnogenol on his website, Garcia placed the
term in the metatags for his website. Because the term “Pycnogenol”
was included on Garcia’s website and in the metatags for the site, search
engines were likely to pull up his site as one of the search results when a
websurfer used the term Pycnogenol.
The Ninth Circuit panel that heard the case initially held that
Garcia had committed trademark infringement both by referring to
Pycnogenol on his website and by including the trademarked term in the
site’s metatags.91 The first panel decision was withdrawn without
explanation. The amended opinion held only that the metatags were
infringing and did not address the issue of whether the references on
Garcia’s website were also infringing.92
The holding that Garcia’s use of Pycnogenol in his metatags is
infringing is problematic. There are millions of websites available on
the Web.93 If Garcia cannot use the Pycnogenol trademark in his
metatags, the chances of anyone locating his site will be reduced.94
Consumers should not be required to know the chemical compound of
the product or that it derives from pine bark. When a websurfer types in
the term “Pycnogenol” to a search engine she should be able to pull up
Garcia’s website as well as Horphag’s. Consumers should be able to
locate alternative products that are similar or, in this case, virtually
identical. Moreover, Garcia is selling the identical product sold as
Pycnogenol in Europe; some websurfers may be aware of the foreign
trade name and be searching for a product similar to or identical to the
European product. The Pycnogenol metatag also accurately describes
the website because the website refers to the history of the product and

90

The website stated that
[t]he original FRENCH Pycnogenol® and Horphag’s U.S. Pycnogenol® are NOT the
same, Horphag’s U.S. Pycnogenol® “borrows’’ from the 50 years of research for
Masquelier’s authentic and original FRENCH Pycnogenol® (now called
MASQUELIER’s® in the U.S.). Therefore, the original French Pycnogenol®,
MASQUELIER’s® and this web site are neither endorsed, nor sponsored by, nor
affiliated with Horphag Research, Ltd.
Excerpts of Record at 86, Horphag Research, 337 F.3d 1036 (Nos. 01-56733, 01-55142).
91 Horphag Research, 337 F.3d at 1039-42.
92 See id.
93 Google claims that its search engine indexes more than eight billion webpages. See
Google, http://www.google.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
94 Because search engines increasingly do not use metatags to locate search results,
consumers may still be able to locate Garcia’s site using the search term “pycnogenol.” See supra
note 41 and discussion infra Part III.B.3.b.
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the scientific studies that support its efficacy, both of which refer to
“Pycnogenol.”
The suggestion from the initial panel decision that Garcia could not
refer to “Pycnogenol” on his website is even more troubling than its
holding with regard to the metatags. Garcia cannot accurately describe
the Masquelier product and its origins without reference to Pycnogenol.
Moreover, Garcia cannot refer to the research showing the efficacy of
the pine bark extract without using the name “Pycnogenol” since all of
the research was conducted using the brand name. A similar situation
arises with generic drugs, both prescription and over-the-counter.
Without the ability to refer to the trademarked product by its trademark,
it would be difficult, for example, to inform consumers that
acetaminophen is a comparable substitute for Tylenol. Competing
businesses should be able to describe their products as being made of
the same substance as a trademarked product if such statements are
truthful and do not confuse consumers as to the source or sponsorship of
the product.
Horphag and similar cases in other circuits prevent competing
online businesses from designing their websites so that consumers can
find them and from providing truthful information about their products.
Perhaps even more troubling, these cases suggest that when a
trademarked term is entered into a search engine, results may have to be
limited to search results from the trademark holder. Several courts have
already held that search engines may be liable for providing search
results and online advertising based on search terms that include
trademarks. In Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications
Corp.,95 the Ninth Circuit examined the use of keyed advertisements96
and banner advertising97 on the Internet. The defendant, Netscape, a
search engine and web browser, sold advertising linked to its searches.
In particular, Netscape sold an adult-oriented list of words, including
the trademarked terms “playboy” and “playmate.” When a user of the
search engine typed in either of these words, advertisements would
appear at the top or sides of the search results for adult-oriented
websites. According to the court, these ads were either not labeled or
confusingly labeled.98 The court held that Netscape, in its capacity as a
search engine, could be held liable for trademark infringement, on either
a contributory or direct liability theory, for a banner advertisement

95
96

354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
Keyed advertisements are ads that appear depending on the search term used by a
consumer and are generally related to the subject of the search term or a relevant category of
consumers.
97 Banner advertisements can be keyed or not keyed, but they appear at the top or sides of a
search engine results page like a banner.
98 See id. at 1030.
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produced by a third party and keyed to Netscape’s search results.99
Fortunately, in contrast to many other initial interest confusion cases,
the Netscape court suggested in dicta that if the advertisements had been
clearly labeled so as to dispel likely confusion, there would not have
been trademark infringement.100 Despite such dicta, the Netscape
opinion cites Brookfield with approval for the proposition that diversion
can be a basis for trademark infringement.101
To the extent that consumers were likely to be confused as to the
sponsorship of the banner advertisements and that such confusion was
not likely to be quickly dispelled upon clicking on the advertisement,
the ultimate holding in Netscape may be correct. However, the court
did not consider the likelihood that many Internet users know that ads
on search engines are generally not associated, in a business sense, with
the search results or search terms. The court’s suggestion that Netscape
needs to remove the terms “playboy” and “playmate” from its list of
words to which advertisements are linked is particularly troubling.102
The court essentially limits the ability of competitors in the adult
website business, such as Hustler, to display their magazine on the same
virtual newsstand shelf as Playboy.103
Although ultimately concurring in the Netscape opinion, Judge
Berzon’s separate opinion provides a strong dissenting voice against the
finding of trademark infringement absent evidence of likely confusion.
Judge Berzon’s concurrence emphasizes that comparison shopping and
diversions are fair game in the brick and mortar world and should also
be fair game on the Internet.104 In the brick and mortar world, when you
enter a drugstore, for example, and ask for assistance locating Tylenol,
you will likely be directed to the pain reliever aisle where you are free
99 See id. at 1024, 1029-31. The court declined to decide which theory of liability applied.
Id. at 1024; see also Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1385,
1387, 1391 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing infringement case to go forward against search engine for
selling advertisements on website keyed to trademarked terms); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v.
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (same). But see 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400, 411 & n.15 (2d Cir. June 27, 2005) (distinguishing pop-up ads that
court held are not trademark uses with keyed advertisements linked to search engine results);
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 749 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (concluding
that pop-up ads are not infringing in part because consumers are likely to know ads are not
affiliated with websites).
100 Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d at 1025 n.16.
101 Id. at 1028-30. But see id. at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring) (calling for overruling of
Brookfield).
102 Id. at 1029-31; see also Playboy Enters. v. Asia Focus, No. Civ.A. 97-734-A, 1998 WL
724000, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (prohibiting, among other things, the use of the phrase
“the playboy in all of us”).
103 The conclusion is also troubling because playboy and playmate are arguably generic terms.
See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 902 (1987) (defining “playboy” as “a
man who lives a life devoted chiefly to the pursuit of pleasure” and “playgirl” as “a woman who
lives a life devoted chiefly to the pursuit of pleasure”).
104 Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring).
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to choose generic acetaminophen or Aleve instead of Tylenol. Yet on
the Internet, several recent decisions, such as Netscape and Horphag,
prevent similar forms of advertising and comparison shopping online.
The initial interest confusion doctrine’s significant limitation on
consumer’s access to truthful information and a competitor’s ability to
advertise its products and services is not limited to the Internet. The
overwhelming success in recent years by plaintiffs arguing initial
interest confusion as a basis for liability has led to an increase in the
successful application of the doctrine by plaintiffs offline. For example,
courts have found trademark liability under an initial interest confusion
theory when consumers have associated one product with another’s
trademarked good, even though consumers are not confused as to
source, sponsorship or affiliation. In Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry
Creations, Inc.,105 a district court held that watches designed to look
similar to Cartier watches could be found to infringe Cartier’s trade
dress if consumers were initially “attracted” to the watches, even if
consumers knew that the “knock-offs” were not Cartier watches.106
This decision and others like it fly in the face of long-standing Supreme
Court decisions holding that competitors can slavishly copy another
company’s product so long as consumers are not confused as to the
origin or sponsorship of the goods, and the products are not protected by
copyright or patent law.107
The application of initial interest confusion offline is broader than
simply knock-off cases. For example, in Shell Trademark Management
v. Canadian American Oil Co., Inc.,108 Shell sued one of its franchisees,
Canadian American, for selling a cheaper gasoline made by Touchless,
as well as Shell gasoline at its gas station. On the sign for the gas
station both the Shell logo and Touchless logo were displayed. The
Shell pumps and the canopy over them were painted red and yellow
while the Touchless pumps were off to the side and painted red and
white. The Touchless pumps had a sign on them making clear that
“Touchless gasoline is not a Shell product.”109 Putting aside any
potential contractual violations, Shell contended that “initial interest
confusion,” which is “primarily [applied] in the Internet context,”
prohibited the Canadian American gas station from selling both fuels.110
While skeptical of applying initial interest confusion in this context, the
district court acknowledged that the Brookfield precedent governed and

105
106
107
108
109
110

No. 01 Civ. 11295, 2003 WL 21056809, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003).
Id. at *11 (emphasis added).
See discussion infra Part II.E.
No. 02-01365, 2002 WL 32104586, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2002).
Id. at *1.
Id.
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allowed the case to go forward because there was a possibility of initial
interest confusion.111
b.

Related Competitors

Even when companies are not in direct competition, courts have
applied initial interest confusion to shut down advertising, product lines,
and websites for related companies. One such example is the Seventh
Circuit decision in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,112 in which
the court held that an herbal supplement manufacturer could not market
a dietary supplement intended to combat depression under the name
“Herbrozac” because the name infringed Eli Lilly’s trademark for the
anti-depressant Prozac.113 The defendant, Natural Answers, developed,
marketed and sold herbal dietary supplements called “Herbscriptions”
which it posited as “drug alternatives.”114 Several of the Herbscriptions
included names that readily conjure up more traditional medication
brand names, such as Herbalium, Herbaspirin, and Herbadryl.115
Despite the similarity between the Herbrozac and Prozac names,
consumers were not likely to confuse the two products. The product
name for “Herbrozac” emphasizes the herbal nature of the supplement
in contrast to the synthetic prescription medication, Prozac. Both the
packaging and the tablets for Herbrozac and Prozac looked dramatically
different—Herbrozac was a large dark brown tablet with black specs
and had a distinct herbal odor, while Prozac was, and still is, a small
green and white pill.116 Herbrozac was clearly labeled as a dietary
supplement and could be obtained without a prescription. Each bottle
of Herbrozac clearly stated that “[t]his product is not intended to
diagnose, treat or cure any disease.”117
Despite the fact that confusion was unlikely, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that Natural Answers had committed trademark
infringement.118 The court noted that some pharmaceutical companies
had expanded their lines to include dietary supplements, and that
consumers might therefore think that Eli Lilly sponsored the herbal
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at *4-8.
233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 460.
Id. At the time of the court’s decision, Herbscriptions were sold over the Internet but
Natural Answers intended to expand to sell its products at retail outlets such as health food and
grocery stores. Id.
116 Prozac also comes in several all-green versions. See Drugs.com Pill Identification for
“Prozac,” http://www.drugs.com/xq/cfm/pageID_1152/search_true/qx/index.htm (last visited
September 10, 2005).
117 Natural Answers, 233 F.3d at 460.
118 Id. at 463-69.

2005]

INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION

137

supplement.119 If consumers were in fact likely to think that Eli Lilly
made Herbrozac, the court’s conclusion might be supportable, but there
are several indications that the court’s conclusion was instead based
merely on initial interest. First, the court’s analysis focuses on
“divert[ing] consumers away from doctors by ‘having them go natural
first and not go with drugs.’”120 This language suggests that the court
focused less on the likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship than on the
possibility that some consumers might choose to try the natural remedy
instead of Prozac.121
The Natural Answers court also held that Natural Answers’s use of
“prozac” in the metatags for its website infringed Eli Lilly’s trademark
on initial interest confusion grounds.122 The court’s conclusion with
regard to the metatags is deeply flawed and perpetuates the erroneous
logic of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brookfield that “[u]sing
another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a sign with
another’s trademark in front of one’s store. As such, it is significant
evidence of intent to confuse and mislead.”123 By using “prozac” in the
keyword and description metatags to its website, Natural Answers is not
misleading consumers—or more accurately the search engines and
webcrawlers that help consumers locate websites. The use of “prozac”
in Natural Answers’s metatags accurately describes the website: The
site explains that Herbrozac is an herbal food supplement that can
reduce the symptoms of depression and is something consumers can try
before resorting to prescription drugs such as Prozac.
Like the search for products similar to iTunes, consumers should
be able to look for something like Prozac, but not Prozac. And like
walking down the supermarket aisle, I should be able to ask for Tylenol,
not acetaminophen, even if I want an alternative pain reliever.
Consumers may well want to compare prescription anti-depressants and
may not know the names of other drugs such as Wellbutrin or Zoloft.
Even though Eli Lilly can and should be able to prevent others from
misleading consumers into thinking that they are buying Prozac when
they are really getting an herbal supplement or another prescription antidepressant, it should not be able to prevent consumers from considering
alternatives to Prozac.
The application of initial interest confusion also prevents providers
of repair and maintenance services for trademarked products from
119
120
121

Id. at 462.
Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
To the extent that the court was concerned about the efficacy of Natural Answers’s
Herbrozac or thought that herbal supplements should be more heavily regulated, the proper venue
for remedying that concern was before Congress, not through trademark law.
122 Id. at 465 (citing Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Video, 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1999)).
123 Id. (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064).
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advertising and properly identifying their services. For example, the
Seventh Circuit in Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp.,124 held
that Equitrac, a company that makes cost-recovery equipment and
repairs similar equipment made by the plaintiff, Promatek, could not use
the Promatek metatag to describe its website. If Equitrac cannot use
Promatek in its metatags, some search engines will be less likely to
locate its website when consumers put in the search term “promatek.”125
This means that consumers may be denied the opportunity to compare
cost-tracking equipment and will be less likely to locate the full range of
repair services available for their Promatek equipment. If consumers
using the search term “promatek” are not allowed to pull up any
websites other than Promatek’s official site, it will be very difficult to
locate other services that repair Promatek equipment. This holding
essentially gives Promatek a monopoly over repairs to its machines at
the expense of consumers and other lawfully competing businesses.
Moreover, like the other initial interest confusion cases, Promatek relies
on a finding of trademark infringement where there is no likelihood of
confusion.
c.

Non-Competitors

Courts have applied initial interest confusion to find trademark
infringement even in situations in which the defendant is not competing
with a trademark holder. In these instances, the initial interest
confusion logic has even less solid ground to stand on because
confusion is much less likely and the trademark holder is unlikely to be
harmed. For example, a district court in New York held that Eric Louis
Associates, a company that provides temporary placement services for
accountants, could not provide a link on its website to the New York
State Society of Certified Public Accountants (NYSSCPA) or use
“NYSSCPA” in its description or keyword metatags.126 The placement
service and the NYSSCPA did not compete for customers nor were
consumers likely to think that NYSSCPA sponsored or was affiliated
with Eric Louis Associates, the placement service. Nevertheless, the
court held that because an Internet user who was looking for the
NYSSCPA might be momentarily diverted, though not confused, when

124
125

300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).
Because fewer and fewer search engines rely on metatags today, many search engines will
still locate the site if the word “promatek” is used in the site’s text. See supra note 41, discussion
infra Part III.B.3.b., and infra note 293.
126 New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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Eric Louis Associates came up as a search result, there was trademark
infringement under the initial interest confusion doctrine.127
Initial interest confusion also has been applied in the parody
context. In Dr. Seuss Enterprises L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc.,128
for example, the Ninth Circuit held that a humor book titled The Cat
NOT in the Hat, about the O.J. Simpson trial written in the style of Dr.
Seuss, infringed the trademark in Dr. Seuss’s Cat in the Hat under an
initial interest confusion theory.129 The book clearly labeled itself a
“parody,” listed the author as Dr. Juice and explained that the story was
“As told to Alan Katz and Illustrated by Chris Wrinn.” Putting aside
any potential copyright and trademark dilution issues, there is little
likelihood that a consumer would be confused into thinking that Dr.
Seuss sponsored the work. Yes, a consumer might be intrigued,
attracted, or initially interested because of the reference to Dr. Seuss’s
Cat in the Hat, but not confused. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit upheld
an injunction against the publication of the book because consumers
might become interested in the book as a result of associating it with Dr.
Seuss and thereby having more positive feelings towards the book.130
The application of initial interest confusion to situations in which
there is no competition highlights some of the doctrine’s greatest
dangers: Businesses are unreasonably limited in their advertising,
marketing, and products, and consumers are denied valuable
information and choices. At the same time, the trademark holder’s
mark is in no jeopardy of losing its value or ability to distinguish its
goods in the marketplace. Moreover, reference to a trademark holder’s
product can often be free publicity for the trademark holder and its
product or service. In the Eric Louis Associates case, the Eric Louis
website made it more likely that the public would visit and know about
the NYSSCPA site.131 Similarly, reading “Dr. Juice’s” book written in
the style of Dr. Seuss’s writings might encourage people to read or
purchase their favorite Dr. Seuss books.

127
128
129

Id. at 342 (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1036, 1062).
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
There was also a copyright infringement action in the case. I do not address the validity of
the copyright claim in the case, but limit my analysis to the issue of trademark infringement.
130 Id. at 1405.
131 This is true not only because people might link to the NYSSCPA site from the Eric Louis
site, but also because the more websites that link to a particular website the higher up in the
search results a website often appears. Google, for example, weights results based on the number
of other sites that link to a particular website. See supra note 41.
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Initial Interest Confusion Conflicts With Trademark
Law’s First Sale Doctrine

The initial interest confusion doctrine also conflicts with specific
well-established principles in trademark law. Trademark law, like
copyright and patent law, provides that a consumer who purchases a
good can freely resell that good without committing trademark
infringement.132 Being able to resell goods necessitates the ability to
advertise the sale of such goods. The initial interest confusion doctrine
severely limits the freedom of consumers to resell products. By limiting
the ability of businesses to use trademarks in metatags, domain names,
and even on their websites, courts have made it very difficult to resell
goods online.133
If web users and websites cannot use trademarked terms to identify
their websites or receive choices after having searched for a
trademarked term, then the ability of consumers to resell their
possessions will be greatly reduced. For example, how can you
describe the fact that you are selling your Nissan Altima without being
able to refer to either Nissan or Altima? Advertising a “mid-size
Japanese car” will certainly not provide potential purchasers with
sufficient information.
The Sixth Circuit, in PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Technologies,
L.L.C.,134 addressed the issue of the use of another’s trademark in the
metatags, domain names, and text of websites that sold used trucks. In
PACCAR, the defendant, TeleScan, ran several websites that sold or
linked to dealers that lawfully sold new and used Kenworth and
Peterbilt trucks, trademarks held by the plaintiff PACCAR, the leading
manufacturer of heavy trucks and truck parts in the United States.
Some of these domain names included the Peterbilt or Kenworth
trademarks,
for
example,
“peterbiltusedtrucks.com”
and
“kenworthusedtrucks.com.” TeleScan also used the terms Peterbilt and
Kenworth in the metatags for its websites. Each of TeleScan’s websites
contained a disclaimer explaining that the website “provides a listing
132 See Davidoff & Cie, SA v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001);
Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, 84 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1996); Sebastian Int’l, Inc.
v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995); Matrix Essentials, Inc. v.
Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d 587, 593 (5th Cir. 1993); H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med.
Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24 cmt b. (1995); 4 ALTMAN, supra note 37, § 22.17.
133 See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 250-51 (6th Cir. 2003)
(finding likelihood of confusion based on initial interest confusion when defendant used
competitor’s trademark in domain names); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., No.
CIV.A. 00-1111, 2002 WL 1301304, at *3-4 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002) (finding likelihood of
confusion based on initial interest confusion when defendant’s website linked to dealers and
sellers of new and used Caterpillar equipment and used “Caterpillar” in domain names).
134 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003).
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service for name brand products and has no affiliation with any
manufacturer whose branded products are listed herein.”135
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the effect of the disclaimers because it
deemed the case one of initial interest confusion in which disclaimers
are irrelevant.136 The court rejected the “first sale” defense because
there was initial interest confusion.137 The court left open the question
of whether the use of the trademarked terms in the metatags was
infringing. Under the holding of Brookfield, however, the use of
PACCAR’s trademark in the metatags would likely be considered
infringing.138
The PACCAR decision may ultimately have been correct because
of some facts particular to the case: (1) the disclaimer was hidden and
(2) background wallpaper on the websites used the trademarked terms
Peterbilt and Kenworth, suggesting an affiliation or sponsorship with
PACCAR. In combination with the cases holding that any use of
another’s trademark in metatags is infringing, however, PACCAR
suggests that those who resell goods online may have difficulty
directing consumers to their websites. Resellers risk trademark liability
for using the trademark of the product they wish to sell in their
metatags, domain names and even possibly the text of their websites.
Recent cases, like Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications,
also suggest that online auction houses like Ebay could be held liable
for trademark infringement by third-party resellers.
D.

Application of Initial Interest Confusion Increases the
Likelihood of Infringement Findings

The initial interest confusion doctrine not only increases the
number of situations in which an infringement claim can be brought, but
it also makes it much more likely that a given defendant will be found
liable for having infringed a trademark. One of the reasons the initial
interest confusion doctrine increases the likelihood of a finding of
infringement is that some courts treat initial interest confusion as a
confusion test separate and apart from the traditional likelihood of
confusion analysis.139 This is particularly troubling given the otherwise
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
Id. at 253. See also discussion infra Part II.D.
Id. at 257.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
See, e.g., PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 253 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233
F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2003), and Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Video, 174 F.3d 1036,
1062 (9th Cir. 1999)); New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis
Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Corbond Corp. v. Core Foam, Inc., 356
F. Supp. 2d 910, 917 (W.D. Wisc. 2005); Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377, 2003
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extensive weighing and balancing of numerous factors that make up a
determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion.
Determining whether something is likely to be confusing can be very
amorphous; therefore, courts have developed a number of factors that
are considered as part of the likelihood of confusion analysis. These
factors provide a clearer framework for assessing likelihood of
confusion and they protect the public and defendants from overzealous
trademark prosecution.140
Under the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis, a court
examines and weighs an array of factors to determine whether
confusion is likely, including:
(1) The strength of the plaintiff’s mark;141
(2) the similarity of the marks;142
(3) the similarity of the products;143
(4) the likelihood that the prior trademark owner will bridge the gap
between the products;144

WL 22451731, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003); Golden West Fin. v. WMA Mtg. Servs., No. C
02-05727, 2003 WL 1343019, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2003) (“Initial interest confusion is a
distinct harm, separately actionable under the Lanham Act.”); J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F.
Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 2d 1154, 1162-63 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“One type of actionable consumer confusion is known
as ‘initial interest’ confusion.”); Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1094
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (“[L]ikelihood of confusion can be shown on the basis of initial interest
confusion.”), aff’d in part by Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002); Acxiom
Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D. Del. 1998); see also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at
1054 n.16 (holding that the Ninth Circuit’s eight-factor likelihood of confusion test does not fit
well in the Internet context and that initial interest confusion analysis is sufficient to determine
trademark infringement); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 493
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (considering initial interest confusion both as separate analysis and as part of
actual confusion and sophistication factors), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005).
140 Although these factors were meant to facilitate the determination of the complex question
of whether likelihood of confusion occurs, what was said by Judge Friendly in 1961 remains true
today: “The problem of determining how far a valid trademark shall be protected with respect to
goods other than those to which its owner has applied it, has long been vexing and does not
become easier of solution with the years.” Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,
495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also Stephen C. Root, Trade Dress, the “Likelihood of Confusion,” and
Wittgenstein’s Discussion of “Seeing As”: The Tangled Landscape of Resemblance, 30 SETON
HALL L. REV. 757, 759-60 (2000) (“[A]lthough these tests represent pragmatic attempts to deal
with the puzzling and problematic nature of determining the existence and degree of resemblance,
the tests remain—as is routinely noted by the very courts applying them—contingent, unwieldy,
often incomplete, and, in many ways, generally unsatisfactory.”).
141 The stronger the mark the greater the protection. See Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor
Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2005); Nautilus Group, Inc. v. ICON Health and Fitness, Inc.,
372 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
142 The more similar the marks, the more likely it is that a court will find infringement.
Nautilus Group, 372 F.3d at 1344-45; Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972-73
(10th Cir. 2002).
143 If the products are the same or similar, courts conclude that consumers are more likely to
be confused. See Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1056 (8th Cir. 2005);
Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 458-59.
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(5) the similarity of marketing methods and channels of
distribution;145
(6) the defendant’s good faith or intent in adopting the mark;146
(7) the quality and cost of the products;147
(8) the sophistication of the buyers and the degree of care they are
likely to exercise in making the purchasing decision;148 and
(9) actual confusion.149

Over time every circuit has adopted some variation of these factors.150
Even when courts consider the likelihood of confusion factors in
an initial interest confusion case, they often discount several key
144 Bridging the gap describes the process of moving into the product or market area of the
defendant. This factor seeks to protect a senior user’s ability to enter a related market at some
future time. Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 459-60.
145 The more similar the marketing channels the more likely a finding of confusion.
Playmakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2004); AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy
Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 793 (6th Cir. 2004).
146 A plaintiff does not need to show intent to demonstrate trademark infringement, but courts
consider intent in the likelihood of confusion factors because there is an assumption that if a
defendant intended to confuse consumers he is more likely to have succeeded in doing so than
someone who was not trying to confuse consumers. See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §
22 (1995).
147 If a good is of low quality and cheap, consumers are likely to expend less care in
purchasing the good and therefore there is a greater chance of confusion. In contrast, if a good is
of high quality and expensive, then consumers are less likely to be confused by similar goods
because they will take extra care in making their purchase. Some courts also point to a disparity
in quality between goods as decreasing the chance of confusion. See, e.g., Savin Corp., 391 F.3d
at 460-61.
148 By sophistication, courts refer to several components of a purchasing decision such as how
educated the buyer is and how knowledgeable a buyer is about a particular product. The more
sophisticated a consumer, the less likely he or she is to be confused. Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at
461; Maxim’s Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir. 1985).
149 Actual confusion is demonstrated by evidence that consumers have actually been confused
by the use of the mark in commerce. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23
(1995).
150 Many circuits use different numbers of factors and express the factors differently from one
another. See, e.g., Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1205
(1st Cir. 1983) (8 factors); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961) (8 factors); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (10 factors);
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (7 factors); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece,
141 F.3d 188, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1998) (7 factors); Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th
Cir. 1991) (8 factors); Rust Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1216 (7th
Cir. 1997) (7 factors); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (8
factors); Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 833 (10th Cir. 2005) (6 factors);
Alliance Metals, Inc. v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895, 907 (11th Cir. 2000) (7 factors);
Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), 312 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2004) (7 factors); In
re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (considering 13 factors in
reviewing denial of federal registration (citing In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (CCPA 1973))); see also Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, The
Lanham Act: Time for a Face-Lift?, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1019 (2002) (describing the
varying likelihood of confusion tests and the fact that even though many of the factors overlap the
different phrasings often lead to different meanings).
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factors, making it much more likely that a defendant will be found to
have infringed a trademark or committed unfair competition. For
example, the vast majority of courts do not consider disclaimers to
weigh against a finding of trademark infringement in initial interest
confusion situations.151 In a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis,
the use of a disclaimer that makes clear that a given product or service
is not related to that of a trademark holder is sometimes considered
sufficient to dispel any confusion.152 When disclaimers are not
considered a potential remedy to confusion, the odds that a defendant
will be found liable for infringement dramatically increase. Dismissing
the value of disclaimers in clearing up possible confusion eliminates the
possible defense that any initial confusion was de minimis. Even
though disclaimers might not be seen at the time of initial interest or
even initial confusion, they still protect consumers and serve to remedy
any significant confusion.
Many courts also do not consider the sophistication of purchasers
or the care purchasers take in making a purchase when applying the
initial interest confusion doctrine.153 These courts conclude that if
consumers are initially confused then their subsequent sophistication in
151 See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 2003); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, 233 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 2000); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400
(2d Cir. 2005); Shell Trademark Mgmt. BV v. Canadian Am. Oil Co., No. 02-01365, 2002 WL
32104586, at *5, *7-9 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2002); Caterpillar Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., No.
CIV.A. 00-1111, 2002 WL 1301304, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002); Key3Media Events, Inc. v.
Convention Connection, Inc., No. CV-S-001311, 2002 WL 385546, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 25,
2002); Simon Property Group, L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., No. IP 99-1195-C, 2001 WL 66408, at *22
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 2001); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190
(W.D.N.Y. 2000); PACCAR, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (E.D. Mich. 2000); New York State Soc’y of
Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see
also MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:6; cf. Horphag Research Ltd v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036,
1042 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding infringement without mentioning defendant’s disclaimer, which
appears at Excerpts of Record at 86).
152 See, e.g., Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding that disclaimer on refurbished golf balls was sufficient to dispel likelihood of
confusion). Courts often propose disclaimers as a remedy in traditional infringement actions.
153 See, e.g., PACCAR, 319 F.3d 243, 253-54; Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300
F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260
(2d Cir. 1987); WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 502-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other
grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants, 79
F. Supp. 2d at 341-42, 345; OBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90; Bishops Bay Founders Group, Inc. v.
Bishops Bay Apartments, L.L.C., 301 F. Supp. 2d 901, 912 (W.D. Wis. 2003); Grotrian,
Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 229 U.S.P.Q. 890, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Icon Solutions, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-4178, 1998 WL 314672 (E.D.
Pa. June 15, 1998). But see Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d
270, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2001) (both sophistication of purchasers and relatedness of products
probative in initial interest confusion context); Rust Env’t & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Teunissen, 131
F.3d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1997) (considering sophistication of purchasers in initial interest
confusion analysis).
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determining that two goods are not related is irrelevant. The courts’
dismissal of the sophistication of purchasers in the initial interest
context is illogical because sophisticated purchasers are less likely to be
initially confused. Consider the Grotrian case: Purchasers of pianos are
generally considered highly sophisticated consumers of expensive
products.154 Most consumers who seek out a high-end piano will
probably start with a particular piano in mind, such as a Steinway. Even
though a consumer could initially be interested in a German-made
“Steinweg” piano because it sounds similar to “Steinway,” such
sophisticated purchasers are much less likely to be confused about the
two brands being the same or having a business affiliation. Thus, the
sophistication of purchasers and the likely care exercised in purchasing
an expensive good make confusion, even initial confusion, less likely.
Moreover, even if there were some initial confusion, such confusion
would be more likely to be quickly dispelled if sophisticated parties
were involved.
Another factor that lowers the bar for finding infringement is that
courts often count initial interest confusion as evidence of actual
confusion. Traditionally, actual confusion requires a showing that
consumers have actually been confused, but under the initial interest
confusion doctrine, some courts have allowed evidence of actual
interest rather than confusion to meet the standard.155 Evidence of
actual confusion weighs heavily in favor of a finding of infringement,156
so consideration of initial interest confusion in this factor greatly
increases the likelihood of a finding of infringement.
Thus, the initial interest confusion doctrine not only expands the
circumstances under which defendants can be considered to have
infringed a trademark, but by bypassing the traditional likelihood of
confusion analysis, it also unreasonably increases the chances that a
given defendant will be found to have infringed another’s trademark.

154
155

See Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1341-42.
See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.
2004); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1998); Checkpoint Sys.,
269 F.3d at 297-98; see also Natural Answers, 233 F.3d 456, 465 (considering initial interest
confusion as part of actual confusion analysis, but requiring there to be evidence of actual initial
interest confusion not the mere risk of such initial confusion to support the factor).
156 See Savin, 391 F.3d at 459 (“There can be no more positive or substantial proof of the
likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion.” (quoting World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick
Littrell’s New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971))); Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v.
Pinehurst Nat’l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Promatek Indus., 300 F.3d
at 812 (listing three most important factors in likelihood of confusion analysis as similarity of the
marks, defendant’s intent, and evidence of actual confusion); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23 cmt. b (1995) (“[C]onvincing evidence of actual confusion is ordinarily
decisive.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:13.
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Initial Interest Confusion Conflicts With Patent and
Copyright Law

The initial interest confusion doctrine is on a collision course with
patent and copyright law because the doctrine can be used to restrict the
copying of unpatented and uncopyrighted works. This is especially true
in the context of trade dress and design cases. Patent and copyright law
expressly allow a competitor to design a similar or even identical
looking product, and such knock-offs often appeal to consumers
precisely because they are initially interested in the trademark holder’s
product or may even for a brief time think the products are the same.
The Seventh Circuit in Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc.157 explains
the conflict between patent law and initial interest confusion:
[The] notion that “[i]t is inherently unfair for a competitor to enter
the market on the back of the originator of a design” . . . runs
headlong into the patent laws, which grant limited monopolies for
novel and nonobvious products. As a necessary incident to the
patent system, “[a]n unpatented article, like an article on which the
patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and
sold by whoever chooses to do so” . . . . Thus, while trademark law
forbids competitors from copying a product feature that serves as a
source identifier, “effective competition and the penumbra of the
patent laws require that competitors be able to slavishly copy the
design of a successful product.”158

Under established patent and copyright law, the mere inability of
the public to distinguish two similar or even identical articles is not
enough to prevent the selling of both goods.159 Nevertheless, the initial
interest confusion doctrine allows for a finding of infringement when
someone is initially interested in a copy because she likes the original
and wants something similar.160 Patent and copyright law, however, not
only determine “what is protected, but also what is free for all to
use.”161 In copyright law, for example, ideas are not protectable. Yet
the initial interest confusion doctrine allows for the protection of ideas
157
158

94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 383 (rejecting argument that similar trade dress caused trademark infringement under
initial interest confusion theory (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231
(1964))).
159 Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 384.
160 Cf. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (allowing trademark infringement
finding based on similarity of trade dress of cars).
161 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); see also Sears,
376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
Thomas Nachbar in his article Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 272 (2004), suggests that this limitation on trademark and other laws is not a constitutional
but a statutory limitation. I do not address that issue here because, in either case, current law
precludes trademark law from protecting that which copyright and patent law expressly commit to
the public domain.
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when a person may be initially interested in a product or service
because it is a similar concept to a trademark holder’s product.
Moreover, the fact that courts reject the use of disclaimers in the initial
interest confusion context prevents competitors from clarifying any
confusion by clearly labeling their products.
When state and federal laws conflict, federal law generally
preempts state law.162 A more complex issue arises when two federal
laws appear in conflict. Courts must, if possible, interpret the two
federal statutes so that they do not conflict.163 Accordingly, courts
should read trademark law in harmony with copyright and patent law.
There is nothing in the Lanham Act itself or in the legislative history
that suggests that Congress intended the statute to trump pre-existing
copyright and patent laws. We should therefore assume that Congress
legislated in accord with these other intellectual property frameworks.
Reading the laws in harmony suggests that trademark law cannot limit
mere initial interest or brief initial confusion caused by the similarity of
uncopyrighted or unpatented works.
To the extent that trademark law conflicts with copyright and
patent law, copyright and patent principles should prevail because both
patent and copyright protection are constitutionally mandated,164
whereas trademark protection is authorized as an off-shoot of the
Commerce Clause.165 Additionally, the protection of trademarks was
intended to be a much more limited grant of rights than those afforded
under patent and copyright law.166
The issue of whether federal trademark laws are limited by patent
and copyright law has arisen in two recent Supreme Court cases. In
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,167 the plaintiff
designed and patented temporary road signs with a mechanism built
upon two springs to allow the signs to remain upright during severe
162 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 6-28 (3d ed. 2000); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of
Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 207 (2002).
163 3 NORMAN SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §57.6 (6th ed. 2001).
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
165 See Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
166 The House and Senate reports that preceded passage of the Lanham Act repeatedly contrast
trademark protection with “monopolistic grants like patents and copyrights.” S. REP. NO. 791333, at 1275 (1946) (citing Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty,
264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924), and United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918)); H.R.
REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (1945) (same); H.R. REP. NO. 78-603, at 3 (1943) (same); H.R. REP. NO.
77-2283, at 20 (1942) (same); H.R. REP. NO. 76-944, at 3 (1939) (same); see also McLean v.
Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877) (contrasting trademark protection with copyright and patent
protection because there is no invention, creativity or skill involved in the trademarking of
goods). See also discussion supra Part III.B.1.
167 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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weather conditions. When the patents for the design expired, a
competitor started making similar signs using a spring mechanism that
looked identical and was in fact identical to that of the plaintiff’s signs.
The plaintiff sued under the Lanham Act.168 The Supreme Court
rejected the Lanham Act claim based on the use of identical trade dress.
The Court’s holding relied on the functionality of the trade dress, a
trademark concept, and left open the question of whether the holder of
an expired utility patent could ever claim trade dress protection.169
Dicta in TrafFix Devices suggests, however, that trademark law, even as
set forth by the Lanham Act, must yield to copyright and patent laws.
In its analysis, the TrafFix Devices Court cited to Bonito Boats v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.170 for the proposition that uncopyrighted or
unpatented works can be copied regardless of trade dress protection:
Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many
instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products.
In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or
copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the
Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged or
disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive economy.171

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dastar v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.172 confirms this reading of TrafFix Devices,
concluding that copyright laws limit the scope of the Lanham Act. In
Dastar, the defendants copied a work in the public domain, a video,
without identifying the original author of the program.173 The plaintiff
sued, saying that the lack of attribution violated the Lanham Act
because consumers were likely to be deceived into thinking that the
defendant had authored the work. The Court rejected this argument
explaining:
[A]ccording special treatment to communicative products . . . causes
the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which
addresses that subject specifically. The right to copy, and to copy
without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like [the right to
make an article whose patent has expired]—including the right to
make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—passes to the
public.174
168 Id. at 25-28. There was also an issue of the products having similar names, WindMaster
and Windbuster, on the basis of which the district court found trademark infringement. This issue
was not brought before the Supreme Court.
169 Id. at 28-35.
170 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
171 TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29 (citing Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160).
172 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
173 Id. at 25-27. The copyright on the work had expired and the work had thus fallen into the
public domain. Id.
174 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230
(1964)).
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Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear that in construing the
Lanham Act, courts cannot “misuse or overexten[d]” trademark law
“into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.”175 The
Lanham Act cannot be used to create a “mutant copyright law,”176
otherwise it could be used to create “a species of perpetual patent and
copyright, which Congress may not do.”177
If a work is free to be copied under patent or copyright law,
trademark law cannot prevent such copying. Trademark law must yield
to patent and copyright law, even when confusion is possible.
Trademark law can, however, require that competitors try to reduce the
likelihood of consumer confusion. The Supreme Court, for example,
has suggested that disclaimers or labeling may be required to make clear
who is the producer of a legitimately copied good. In Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., the Supreme Court held that a state’s unfair
competition laws could not prevent the duplication of the plaintiff’s
Pole Lamp, even though the defendant’s design was virtually identical.
The Court emphasized that a state could take steps to prevent consumer
confusion by requiring labeling or distinctive packaging but it could not
prevent the manufacturing and sale of identical goods even if the fact of
their being identical caused some confusion. As the Court explained:
[The] mere inability of the public to tell two identical articles apart is
not enough to support an injunction against copying or an award of
damages for copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be
copied. Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require
that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled
as to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their
trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so
as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading
purchasers as to the source of the goods.178

The same logic applies in the context of federal trademark law.
Thus, states and the federal government can prevent passing off and
misleading packaging and sales practices, but cannot enjoin the sale or
advertising of a product merely because people will be interested in
similar or even identical goods. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
suggested on multiple occasions that some amount of initial confusion
must be tolerated to carry out the directives of patent and copyright law.

175
176
177
178

Id. at 33-34 (quoting TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29).
Id. at 34 .
Id. at 37 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003)).
Sears, 376 U.S. at 232.
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Initial Interest Confusion Violates the First Amendment

The initial interest confusion doctrine also runs afoul of both the
First Amendment and the speech-protective elements written into the
Lanham Act by restricting non-misleading, truthful speech. Congress,
in drafting and amending the Lanham Act, emphasized its concern that
the statute not violate the First Amendment and accordingly built into
its framework several specific limitations to protect free speech. The
main speech-protective limit on the scope of trademark protection is the
requirement of proving a likelihood of confusion in an infringement or
unfair competition action.179 The Lanham Act also limits its expanse by
distinguishing different types of marks and providing a sliding scale of
protection depending on the uniqueness of the mark. Arbitrary, fanciful
and suggestive marks can be immediately protected, while descriptive
marks must obtain secondary meaning before being granted trademark
status. Generic marks cannot be protected.180 Thus, Congress designed
the Lanham Act to leave as many words, phrases and symbols in the
public domain as possible and to require marks that had become
synonymous with a type of product rather than the product itself to be
given back to the public. The Lanham Act also contains a statutory fair
use defense that allows companies and individuals to accurately
describe their own products, even if it requires using a mark that
someone else owns.181 Using the initial interest confusion doctrine to
find trademark infringement absent a showing of likely confusion
directly violates the speech-protective elements built into the Lanham
Act.
The initial interest confusion doctrine also violates the First
Amendment when used to restrict non-confusing references to
trademarks. Even though Congress included some speech-protective
elements in drafting the Lanham Act, trademark law is still
independently limited by the First Amendment.182 The Supreme
Court’s recent holding in Eldred v. Ashcroft183 does not suggest
otherwise. In Eldred, the Court held that because First Amendment
179
180
181
182

Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, supra note 63, at 973.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000); see also discussion infra Part IV.
See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004)
(First Amendment applies to trademark claims when use of trademark is other than as a source
identifier); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (First
Amendment applies to uses of trademarks that are expressive in nature); Westchester Media v.
PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2000) (must consider First Amendment
when evaluating trademark claim and especially in designing remedy); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy
Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (considering limits of First Amendment when evaluating
trademark infringement claim); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating
that First Amendment limits scope of trademark protection).
183 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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protections were written into the Copyright Act and the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, there could not be a separate First
Amendment analysis of the constitutionality of the extension of the
duration of copyright protection.184 In particular, the Court referred to
the exclusion of ideas from copyright protection and the availability of
the fair use defense.185 The Court also pointed to the specific “limited
times” language used in the Copyright and Patent Clause and to the fact
that the Clause was adopted around the same time as the First
Amendment.186 In contrast, there is no specific grant of constitutional
authority for trademark protection. The speech-protective “limited
times” language therefore does not apply to trademark law. Unlike the
Copyright Act, the Lanham Act does not leave ideas in the public
domain and has a very narrow statutory fair use exception. Trademarks
also were never intended to provide the same broad-based property
rights that copyrights and patents afford, but instead to grant a much
more limited property right.187 Thus, a separate First Amendment
analysis is still required when considering the enforcement of trademark
law under the Lanham Act.
Although not all speech involved in trademark infringement
actions falls under the definition of commercial speech, much of it
does.188 The precise contours of what distinguishes commercial from
noncommercial speech are a subject of some controversy both on and
off the Supreme Court,189 as is the question of whether commercial
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 218-21.
Id.
Id. at 218-19.
See discussion supra Part II.E.
The Supreme Court has suggested that if the only purpose of speech is to propose a purely
commercial transaction, it is commercial speech. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). Generally speaking, advertisements for
consumer products, such as shampoo, are considered commercial speech, while advertisements
for movies, books and newspapers are not. Once one moves away from the extreme examples,
however, the distinction is difficult to pinpoint and has been widely criticized. See infra note
189.
189 The difference between commercial speech and noncommercial speech in Supreme Court
doctrine has been repeatedly questioned both by members of the Court and scholars. See
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574-75 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I have
observed previously that there is no ‘philosophical or historical basis for asserting that
‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech.’ Indeed, I doubt whether
it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech.”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-23 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part) (questioning justification for distinguishing between commercial and
noncommercial speech); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493-97 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (questioning “artificiality” of a rigid commercial/non-commercial distinction); see
also Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins of the Commercial
Speech Doctrine, 36 RICH. L. REV. 91, 101 (2002) (“The distinction between ‘commercial’ and
‘noncommercial’ speech has not been demarcated with any great precision, nor defined by the
Court with any rigor.”); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (describing confused case law on commercial speech); Fred S. McChesney,
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speech should receive less First Amendment protection than noncommercial speech.190 Initial interest confusion, even under the lowest
possible First Amendment scrutiny, is likely to be held unconstitutional
when it is applied to prohibit the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading speech. When noncommercial speech is involved there is
little question that application of the doctrine is unconstitutional.191
Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment so long
as it is not deceptive or misleading and concerns lawful activity.192 The
Supreme Court has emphasized the value of commercial speech: “It is a
matter of public interest that [economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well-informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.”193 “[C]ommerical speech bans not only
hinder consumer choice, but also impede debate over central issues of
public policy.”194 In fact, a “particular consumer’s interest in the free
flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by
far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”195

De-Bates and Re-Bates: The Supreme Court’s Latest Commercial Speech Cases, 5 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 81, 119 (1997) (same); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes and Free
Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 126 (1996) (“After
Liquormart, it is unclear why ‘commercial speech’ should continue to be treated as a separate
category of speech isolated from general First Amendment principles.”); Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 652-53 (1990) (questioning
the legitimacy of any distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech) [hereinafter
Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech].
190 See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 574-77 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that contentdiscriminatory commercial speech restrictions should be analyzed under strict scrutiny); Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(restrictions on commercial speech justified by denying information to the public are per se
unconstitutional); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S at 501, 510-14, 517-18 (plurality opinion of Stevens,
J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.) (suggesting that no restriction on truthful commercial
advertising is justifiable); id. at 518-20 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (contending that strict
scrutiny should apply when government seeks to restrict truthful commercial speech); Rubin, 514
U.S. at 493-97 (Stevens, J., concurring) (urging application of higher standard of review to
restrictions on non-misleading commercial speech); Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of
Commercial Speech, supra note 189, at 648-53.
191 In the context of noncommercial speech, the application of the initial interest confusion
doctrine should be treated as a content-based restriction analyzed under strict scrutiny. In such
instances, the application of the doctrine absent a showing of more than de minimis likely
confusion should be held unconstitutional. I also note that when noncommercial speech is
involved courts might also reject the infringement claim on the alternative grounds that the
allegedly infringing use of a trademark does not qualify as a “trademark use.”
192 Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366 (2002) (citing Virginia Bd. Of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)); Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
193 Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765; see also 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 495-96
(describing historical value of commercial speech); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The AntiHistory and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993).
194 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
195 Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
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Although Supreme Court precedents suggest that commercial
speech deserves less protection than noncommercial speech, the Court
in recent years has provided increasing protection for commercial
speech, and several members of the Court have suggested that strict
scrutiny should apply when restrictions limit truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech.196 The current test for determining whether a
restriction on commercial speech is legitimate is the Central Hudson
test. Under Central Hudson,
[i]f the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, [courts
must] ask “whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.”
If it is, then [courts] “determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted,” and, finally, “whether
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”
Each of these . . . inquiries must be answered in the affirmative for
the regulation to be found constitutional.197

When evaluating the final step of the Central Hudson test, whether
the restriction is more extensive than necessary, courts must “carefully
calculate the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech
imposed by the regulations.”198 Courts must consider the “degree to
which speech is suppressed—or what alternative avenues for speech
remain available.”199
The Central Hudson test has come under fire in recent years from
members of the Court and scholars alike.200 Some have speculated that
196 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574-77 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that content-discriminatory commercial speech restrictions should be
analyzed under strict scrutiny); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (restrictions on commercial speech justified by denying
information to the public are per se unconstitutional); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501, 510-14,
517-18 (1996) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ.) (suggesting
that no restriction on truthful commercial advertising is justifiable); id. at 518-20 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part) (contending that strict scrutiny should apply when government seeks to
restrict truthful commercial speech); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 493-97 (1995)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (higher standard of review should apply to non-misleading commercial
speech); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 699-702 (2003) (describing
increased scrutiny that restrictions on commercial speech have received since the early 1990s).
197 Western States, 535 U.S. at 367 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S at 566). Application of
trademark protections and the initial interest confusion doctrine are generally viewed as being
content-based restrictions on speech because infringement decisions turn on the content of the
speech. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1016 (9th Cir.
2004); Volokh, supra note 196. Even if such restrictions are considered content-neutral, the
Supreme Court has treated the analysis under the O’Brien time, place, and manner test as the
same as that under the Central Hudson test. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987). I therefore apply the Central Hudson test
for simplicity.
198 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (citations and quotations omitted); Greater New Orleans, 527
U.S. at 188.
199 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 563.
200 See Western States, 535 U.S. at 367 (observing that “several members of the Court have
expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis”); id. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring)
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the Court, when given an appropriate case, may replace the Central
Hudson test. It is even possible that the Court will go further and
provide full First Amendment protection to commercial speech. The
usefulness of applying the Central Hudson test is therefore somewhat
limited—this is especially true given the inconsistency of the cases
decided under the test.201 Nevertheless, several principles can be
garnered from the nearly thirty years of cases decided by the Supreme
Court since it held that commercial speech was protected by the First
Amendment. When truthful, non-deceptive speech is at issue, the Court
has generally struck down restrictions on commercial speech.202 In
striking down a ban on advertisements for alcohol that included pricing
information, the Court explained: “Precisely because bans against
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect
consumers from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond
‘irrationally’ to the truth.”203
The Court’s 2002 decision in Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center204 highlights that when the government can achieve its interests

(rejecting Central Hudson test at least where truthful, non-misleading speech is at issue);
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554 (recognizing that several members of court have questioned Central
Hudson but observing that is not necessary to break new ground in case); id. at 571-72 (Kennedy,
J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (questioning validity of Central Hudson because it is
underprotective of truthful commercial speech); id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring) (contending
that strict scrutiny should apply to advertising restrictions on truthful speech); Greater New
Orleans, 527 U.S. at 184 (recognizing that “certain judges, scholars and amici curiae have
advocated repudiation of the Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more
straightforward and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on
commercial speech”); id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (Central Hudson should not apply when
government’s goal is to keep public “ignorant”); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (questioning logic of Central Hudson); id. at 518-19 (Thomas, J., concurring in part)
(criticizing application of Central Hudson when government’s justification is based on keeping
public “ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace”); Rubin, 514 U.S. at
493-97 (Stevens, J., concurring) (questioning application of Central Hudson standard to nonmisleading commercial speech).
201 See generally Volokh, supra note 196; Rotunda, supra note 189; Post, supra note 189;
McChesney, supra note 189; Sullivan, supra note 189; Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of
Commercial Speech, supra note 189.
202 See, e.g., Western States, 535 U.S. at 376-77 (striking down ban on advertisements for
compounded drugs); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 570 (striking down restrictions on tobacco
advertisements); Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. 195-96 (striking down restrictions on
advertisements for gambling in states where gambling is legal); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484, 489
(striking down ban on advertisements that “provide the public with accurate information about
retail prices of alcoholic beverages”); Rubin, 514 U.S. 476, 491 (striking down prohibition on
placing alcohol content on beer labels); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771-72 (1993) (striking
down ban on truthful, non-deceptive information provided by CPAs to potential clients); Peel v.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) (striking down
advertising ban that prevented attorneys from accurately promoting their certifications in
specialized fields).
203 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
204 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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without restricting speech or by restricting less speech, it must do so.
“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating
speech must be a last—not first—resort.”205 The Court in Western
States held that the federal government could not prohibit the
advertising and promotion of compounded drugs despite accepting as
substantial the government’s interest in protecting consumers. The
Court held that there were other ways to protect consumers from
untested compounded drugs besides denying them truthful information,
such as requiring labeling on compounded drugs to warn consumers that
the drugs had not undergone FDA testing.206 The Court emphasized
that the government cannot suppress truthful information simply out of
“fear that people would make bad decisions.”207
The Western States majority cited and quoted extensively from the
analysis in Virginia Board of Pharmacy.208 In Virginia Board of
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court rejected a ban on advertising information
and prices for prescription drugs, explaining:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach [of banning truthful advertising]. That alternative is to
assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels
of communication rather than to close them. . . . [T]he choice among
these alternative approaches is not ours to make [or the legislature’s].
It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available,
that the First Amendment makes for us.209

The Court made clear that the State of Virginia could regulate
pharmacists but could not do it by “keeping the public in ignorance of
the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacies are offering.”210 It
is more speech, rather than “enforced silence,” that the First
Amendment demands as a solution for most government concerns.211
“Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of
the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate

205
206
207
208
209

Id. at 373.
Id. at 373-75.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 374-75.
Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (“The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”); Peel v. Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Comm’n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990) (rejecting paternalistic assumptions
that recipients of mailing were “no more discriminating than the audience for children’s
television”).
210 Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
211 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 498.
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information is better than no information.”212 The Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of providing consumers information to
assist in making purchasing decisions.213
In the initial interest confusion context it is even clearer that
truthful commercial speech should not be restricted. Unlike the
circumstances in Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Western States, the
motivation behind shutting down truthful speech about trademarked
products and services is not paternalistic. The fear is not that consumers
will act irrationally, but instead a fear that consumers will react
rationally and choose a competitor’s product over that of a trademark
holder. Thus, even more so than in the paternalistic consumer
protection cases, the Supreme Court is likely to be skeptical of the
government’s justifications for denying consumers truthful, nonmisleading information simply to shore up the strength of individual
trademarks.
Only a handful of Supreme Court cases that are still good law
uphold restrictions on truthful and non-deceptive speech involving a
legal activity.214 The primary circumstances in which the Supreme
Court has upheld restrictions on truthful commercial speech are those in
which the speech is viewed as unduly coercive, invading consumers’
privacy rights, or involving the regulation of a profession, especially
attorneys. In Orhalik v. Ohio State Bar Association,215 for example, the
Court upheld limits on the in-person solicitation of an accident victim
by an attorney within two weeks of the accident while the injured party
was in the hospital.216 Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Went For It,217 the
Supreme Court held that the Florida Bar could stop lawyers from
soliciting clients by direct mail within thirty days of a personal injury or
wrongful death.218 The Court emphasized the serious privacy concerns
involved in contacting likely distraught and vulnerable victims so close
to the time of an accident.219 The Court also highlighted the importance
of maintaining a positive professional image of attorneys.220 None of
these unique factors apply in the initial interest confusion setting.221
212 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562
(1980) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977)).
213 See id. at 567.
214 I do not address Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)
(limiting advertising of gambling in jurisdiction in which gambling was lawful), because it has
been overruled. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508-09; id. at 531-32 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
215 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
216 Id. at 449-53, 460-68.
217 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
218 Id. at 620.
219 Id. at 630-32.
220 Id. The Court also emphasized that lawyers had ample other avenues of advertising
available, including television and radio advertisements, yellow pages and even direct mailing
after the thirty-day period had elapsed.
221 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1993) (Ohralik’s holding was “narrow” and
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Perhaps the case most relevant for considering how the Supreme
Court might analyze the application of the initial interest confusion
doctrine absent a showing of likely confusion is its 1987 decision in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee
[hereinafter “SFAA”].222 SFAA involved a lawsuit brought by the
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) to prevent the SFAA from
holding an athletic competition called the “Gay Olympic Games.”
Although the decision did not involve an action for trademark
infringement, its treatment of a similar provision in the Amateur Sports
Act provides some insight into how the Court might evaluate a
challenge to the initial interest confusion doctrine. The Amateur Sports
Act of 1978 authorizes the USOC to prohibit certain commercial and
promotional uses of certain words, including “Olympic.”223 The statute,
unlike the Lanham Act, does not require a demonstration of likely
confusion.224 The SFAA challenged the constitutionality of the statute
because it did not require such a showing of likely confusion. The
Court applied the Central Hudson/O’Brien test to determine whether the
prohibition on the use of the word “Olympic” violated the First
Amendment.225
The Court concluded that the restriction was
constitutional because Congress had a strong public interest in
promoting amateur athletics and in reaping all of the financial rewards
the USOC had accumulated in the word “Olympic.”226
While at first glance this case may suggest that it is constitutional
to allow a finding of trademark infringement absent a showing of likely
confusion, several crucial factors suggest otherwise. First, the Court
emphasized that there was possible confusion by the SFAA’s use of the
word “Olympic” and pointed out that by passing the statute Congress
may have “reasonably . . . conclude[d] that most commercial uses of the
Olympic words and symbols are likely to be confusing.”227 The Court
described the “possibility for confusion as to sponsorship . . . obvious”

“unique”); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 475, 485-86 (1988) (stating that undue
influence is unlikely outside Ohralik situation); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641-42 (1985) (suggesting that Ohralik does not apply
outside in-person solicitation circumstances); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202-03 (1982)
(explaining that limits on commercial speech only valid if speech is deceptive or subject to
abuse); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 112 (1990)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court has only upheld bans on non-deceptive
advertising when the information is provided in circumstances which are “inherently conducive to
deception and coercion”).
222 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
223 Id. at 525-26; see also 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2000) (formerly 36 U.S.C. § 380) (as expanded
by the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1998).
224 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 530.
225 The Court noted that the two tests are substantially similar. See id. at 536-37 & 537 n.16.
226 Id. at 531-41.
227 Id. at 539.
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given the title “Gay Olympic Games.”228 Thus, the case arguably did
involve a misleading or confusing use of a mark.
Second, the trademark holder in SFAA was an agency affiliated
with the United States government. In contrast, in the initial interest
confusion context most trademark holders are private businesses, who
will likely be afforded lesser protection and whose interests will no
doubt be considered less substantial.
Third, the Supreme Court emphasized that the SFAA could easily
substitute the term “games” for “Olympics” without changing the
meaning. While this conclusion is suspect and has drawn wide and
deserving criticism,229 its logic does not apply when a competitor
simply makes reference to the trademarked product itself. The Court
may well have reached a different conclusion had the USOC sought to
prevent the “Gay Games” from advertising that it was an alternative to
the “Olympics” for gay athletes. Finally, the opinion in SFAA predates
the more stringent analysis that recent commercial speech restrictions
have received.
Although it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will
apply its constantly shifting commercial speech doctrine, the Court is
unlikely to be persuaded that restricting non-misleading references to
another’s trademark constitutes a substantial government interest. In
such instances, speech restrictions do not protect consumers, but instead
deny them useful information and make it more difficult for consumers
to compare products and even for them to choose between products.
Instead, the main justification for the doctrine is to maximize the profits
of trademark holders at the expense of individual consumers and other
competitors in the marketplace. Even the Supreme Court, with its
generally deferential attitude to government interests, is unlikely to be
satisfied by such a justification. Moreover, the restriction on references
to others’ trademarks will likely be viewed as “more extensive than is
necessary” because ample means are not left open to communicate
one’s message.
Application of the initial interest confusion doctrine has already
and will continue to chill speech because of the threat of litigation and
the risk of successful lawsuits. Trademark holders will be able to bully
competitors and critics into silence, thereby leaving the public with
fewer choices, less information about products, and more expensive
goods. The doctrine also risks severely limiting the public’s ability to
express ideas and to communicate. The initial interest confusion
doctrine has been used to give Playboy Enterprises a monopoly over the
228
229

Id.
See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 196, at 736-39; ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 136-38 (1998); Kozinski & Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial
Speech, supra note 189, at 649-50; Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 412-21.
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words “playboy,” “playgirl” and “playmate.”230 Ralph Lauren now has
claim to the word “polo” and has limited the publication of a magazine
called “Polo.”231 The doctrine has given Upjohn the right to prevent
others from using the prefix “pro” for products containing the chemical
compound progesterone.232 Consumers and competitors should be able
to use trademarked words to refer not only to such generic terms, but
also to the trademarked products or services themselves so long as the
uses are not confusing. There is no legitimate justification to prevent a
person, including a competitor, from referring to Tylenol, Prozac or
Kleenex, even though he or she could say acetaminophen, antidepressant or tissue instead. Trademarks often serve as important shorthand to describe a genre of a product. This is true even when a
trademark has not become “generic” in the trademark sense.233 For
example, it is very difficult to describe an item similar to “iTunes” in an
efficient way without using the trademarked term. It is inefficient to use
more words than necessary to describe goods, and it depletes the
richness of our culture and language to be denied the use of certain
words simply because they are trademarked.234
III. MOTIVATION TO ADOPT AND EXPAND INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION
Although the initial interest confusion doctrine has created many
troubling results and potential problems, there are some legitimate
motivations behind its origin and development. Before considering
alternative approaches, it is important to understand the problems that
courts have sought to resolve by creating and applying initial interest
confusion. Some of the concerns raised by members of the judiciary are
justifiable and deserving of solutions; other concerns reflect the
mistaken views that any competition is wrong and that trademark
protections provide broad-based property rights.
230 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 2004).
But see Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing former Playboy
Playmate of the Month to put term “playmate” in metatags for her website).
231 See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 660-61 (5th Cir. 2000).
232 See Upjohn Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 1:95CV237, 1996 WL 33322175, at *8
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 1996).
233 Words become generic when the word stands for the type of good rather than the particular
good manufactured by a particular vendor. Determining whether a mark has become generic,
however, is not clear-cut. Decisions of when something has become generic are very
unpredictable. Words often are considered common words by Webster’s dictionary but still
treated as distinctive by the courts. See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 12.19; LANDES &
POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 196.
234 See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 69, at 268-69 (describing one of main
purposes of trademarks as linguistic efficiency); COOMBE, supra note 229, at 60 (describing
cultural and linguistic value of trademarked words, as well as use of trademarks to protect
efficient communication of information).
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Legitimate Concerns

Pre-Sale Confusion and 1962 Lanham Act Amendments

The seeds of initial interest confusion were first sown in 1962
when Congress amended the Lanham Act to eliminate the requirement
that “purchasers” be deceived. Prior to 1962, the Lanham Act allowed
for a finding of infringement only when the use of a mark was “likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of
origin of such goods or services.”235
In 1962, the reference to “purchasers” was eliminated. Trademark
infringement therefore could be found under Section 32 if the use of a
mark was simply “likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.”236
In specific reference to the deletion of the words “purchasers as to the
source of origin of such goods or services,” the Senate Report explains
that:
The purpose of the proposed change is to coordinate the language
here with that used elsewhere and to omit the word “purchasers,”
since the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as well as
to actual purchasers. The word “purchasers” is eliminated so as to
avoid the possibility of misconstruction of the present language of
the statute.237

Courts properly interpreted the change in the Lanham Act as
broadening the concept of trademark infringement to include
consideration not only of confusion at the time of sale, but also of
confusion that exists prior to the time of sale, and that which emerges
after a sale is completed.238 Many courts properly limit consideration of
the likelihood of confusion to actual or potential purchasers of the
goods or services in question.239 In other words, they do not concern
235 Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, at 437-38 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (2000)) (emphasis added).
236 Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962); see also S. 2429, 86th Cong. (1959). The
language referring to “origin” also was eliminated and provides the basis for the subsequent
expansion of confusion to include confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship.
237 S. REP. NO. 87-2107, at 2847, 2850-51 (1962) (emphasis added); H.R. REP. NO. 87-1108,
at 4 (1961) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 86-1685, at 5 (1960).
238 “Post-sale confusion refers not to the resale of the original product . . . but to the risk that
non-purchasers, who themselves may be future customers, will be deceived.” I.P. Lund Trading
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc.,
94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d
867, 872 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that 1962 amendments allow for likelihood of confusion finding
based on post-sale confusion); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568
(2d Cir. 1971).
239 See, e.g., Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772,
396 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs.,
Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d Cir. 2001); Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group,
L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1999).
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themselves with whether a person who would never consider buying a
piano might be confused between a “Steinway” and a “GrotrianSteinweg” piano. Other courts, however, have read the amended
provision much more broadly to include any person likely to be
confused.240
There can be little question that the 1962 amendments gave
statutory authority for courts to consider consumer confusion that
occurs outside the time of sale, including confusion prior to the time of
sale. But the statute did not retreat from the requirement that a plaintiff
must demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.
2.

Baiting and Switching

Another justification courts provide for the adoption of initial
interest confusion is preventing the practice of baiting and switching.
Baiting and switching involves initially passing off one’s goods as those
of another, even if a consumer ultimately discovers prior to the time of
purchase that the products or services are unrelated. One aspect of
baiting and switching involves “luring” an unwary consumer by
creating initial confusion. It is from this concept that the initial interest
confusion doctrine grew. 241
Baiting and switching is a legitimate concern. If consumers are
misled into believing that a product is made by one company when in
truth it is not and as a result expend significant time and effort to
purchase the deceptive product, then it matters little that the confusion
240 See, e.g., Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 376 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2004)
(considering likelihood of confusion among consumers regardless of whether they are potential
purchasers); Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1997)
(considering confusion among general public). Without explaining his reasoning, J. T. McCarthy
concludes that the 1962 amendments allow a finding of infringement without a showing of
likelihood of confusion and regardless of whether potential purchasers are considered.
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 5:6.
241 Many courts have compared initial interest confusion to baiting and switching practices.
See, e.g., AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 828 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Such
‘bait and switch,’ also known as ‘initial interest’ confusion, will affect the buying decisions of the
consumers when it permits the competitor to ‘get its foot in the door’ by confusing the
consumers.”); Checkpoint Systems, 269 F.3d at 293-95 (comparing initial interest confusion to
“bait[ing] and switch[ing]” and the “luring” of consumers); Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at 382 (same);
Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1999) (same);
Northland Ins. Co. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119 (D. Minn. 2000) (“This ‘initial
interest confusion’ has been described as a ‘bait’ and ‘switch.’”); MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §
23:6; see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“[Initial interest] confusion, which is actionable under the Lanham Act, occurs when a consumer
is lured to a product by its similarity to a known mark, even though the consumer realizes the true
identity and origin of the product before consummating a purchase.”); Rust Env’t &
Infrastructure, Inc., v. Teunissen, 131 F.3d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1997) (comparing “initial interest
confusion” to the “luring” of potential customers).
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is ultimately cleared up prior to the time of purchase. For example,
suppose that a Grotrian-Steinweg dealer places an advertisement that
announces a “Huge Sale on the Original Steinways!” hoping to get
customers in the door who think the store is selling real Steinways. A
person who is misled by the advertisement into thinking she’s going to
get a real “Steinway” for half the price may well drive to a store far
away from her home. By the time she gets to the store and realizes that
the Steinweg is not really a Steinway, she might decide that the
Steinweg is good enough and buy it anyway. Even if she doesn’t, the
deception may have cost her the better part of an afternoon, gas, wear
and tear on her car, and a not insignificant bit of road rage. Courts
correctly treat such pre-sale confusion as unfair competition and
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. The dealer’s deceptive
act limits a consumer’s choices—instead of being provided more
information, a potential purchaser is fed misinformation.
The
competing company in this situation uses trickery and deception to
succeed, rather than making a better or cheaper product than its
competitor. Grotrian-Steinweg should be free to suggest that it has a
historical link to Steinway, if that is true, and to suggest that its pianos
are as good as and cheaper than Steinway’s, but it cannot mislead
consumers into thinking that its pianos are Steinways.
The 1962 amendment to the Lanham Act appropriately and
adequately addresses such baiting and switching practices. Therefore,
there is no need and no authority for courts to create the expansive
initial interest confusion doctrine that applies to situations in which
confusion is unlikely.
B.

Misguided Justifications for Initial Interest Confusion
1.

Trading Off Another’s Goodwill

One of the driving forces behind the adoption and proliferation of
the initial interest confusion doctrine is a gut reaction by some judges
and scholars that defendants are “free-riding” off value built up in a
product or service by a trademark holder. Some courts have expanded
the initial interest confusion doctrine under the misguided notion that a
competitor should never profit from another’s success and that any
decline in the profits of a trademark holder should be remedied. Yet
this initial, visceral reaction flies in the face of basic free market
principles which allow, and in fact demand, that competitors be able to
benefit from value created by others.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has referred to an unjust
enrichment principle that one should not “reap where [one] has not
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sown,”242 this theory (which allows recovery under tort law) has been
applied only in a very limited and exceptional set of circumstances that
do not apply to initial interest confusion.243 The Supreme Court has
applied this “labor-reward” analysis only when the entire value of a
work is destroyed by the actions of a defendant; for example, in the
International News Service case, a competing news agency stole news
stories and published them before the original service could publish
them, thus destroying the entire value of the original work.244 Similarly,
in the Zacchini case, a performance artist’s entire performance (being
shot out of a cannonball) was shown on the evening news, thus
destroying much of the economic value of his performance because
nothing was left for a paying audience to see.245 Similar circumstances
do not arise in the initial interest confusion context. The entire value of
a trademark holder’s product or service is not destroyed simply because
a competitor refers to the trademark holder’s product or service.
Fair competition is not the same as no competition. Competitors
are always harmed when competing goods succeed. The fact that a
trademark holder’s profits may be reduced if a competitor is permitted
to refer to or model its product after a trademark holder’s product is
irrelevant. As William Landes and Richard Posner explain, “[a]
fundamental principle of American law is that competition is not a tort,
that is, an invasion of a legally protected right. Freedom to imitate, to
copy is a cornerstone of competition and operates to minimize
monopoly profits.”246
In the trademark context, the unjust enrichment rationale is limited
by such traditional notions of fair competition. Even though it is true
that the Lanham Act was passed at least in part to protect the goodwill
of businesses, it was meant to do so only in circumstances in which
others profited from a company’s goodwill by deceiving consumers. If
consumers are never confused, trademark infringement should not be an
available remedy—trademark infringement turns on consumer
confusion, not the business losses of a trademark holder. Moreover,
there is a big difference between harming a company’s goodwill and

242
243

Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Int’l News Serv.,
248 U.S. 215; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmts. b & c (1995)
(describing Int’l News Serv. and its unjust enrichment rationale as being very limited doctrine
only applied in rare circumstances when primary market for product is destroyed by competitive
use).
244 Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 243-44.
245 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77 (allowing a right of publicity case under Ohio law to go
forward). But see id. at 579 n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
246 LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 23; see also FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS ch. VIII. (1776);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 708 (1938) (causing business losses is not an unfair trade practice).
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benefiting from that goodwill. Trademark law meant to prevent the
former but not the latter.
Trademark protection is also limited by laws which expressly
allow the public to use copyrighted and patented works once those
patents and copyrights expire. Both patent and copyright law allow for
the copying of an author’s or an inventor’s work once it enters the
public domain or if the work was not deserving of patent or copyright
protection in the first place.247 Thus, the simple fact that someone was
the first to create or build a following for a product is not a basis to
afford intellectual property rights. In holding that Kellogg’s could make
and sell “Shredded Wheat,” even though it had not invented the cereal,
the Supreme Court explained:
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the
article known as “Shredded Wheat”; and thus is sharing in a market
which was created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff’s
predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in
advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the
exercise of a right possessed by all—and in the free exercise of
which the consuming public is deeply interested.248

The Court allows Kellogg’s “free-riding” so long as there is no
deception of consumers or passing off of the Kellogg’s product as that
of Nabisco’s. While the court refers to works not protected by “trademark,” it is clear both from this case and subsequent case law that the
reference to trade-mark protection was circumscribed to circumstances
in which the use of another’s trademark was confusing and particularly
to the situation in which a defendant was passing off its goods as those
of another.
The protection of trademarks was never intended to shut down all
competition. Trademark law requires a balancing not just of consumer
confusion and protection of a trademark holder’s goodwill, but also
consideration of the legitimate interests of competing businesses.249 It
has long been understood “to be in the interest of the public that any
competitor should be free to divert [customers] to himself by all fair and
reasonable means . . . . In short, it is no tort to beat a business rival to
prospective customers.”250 The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition similarly have recognized that fair competition
allows for the distraction of consumers by direct competitors:
247
248
249
250

See discussion supra Part II.E.
Kellogg Co v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
A-Mark Coin Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 195 Cal. Rptr. 859, 866-67 (1983) (emphasis
added) (describing state tort law); see also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 207, 215
(3d Cir. 1995) (citing Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 121, and Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters.,
40 F.3d 1431, 1445 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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The freedom to compete necessarily contemplates the probability of
harm to the commercial relations of other participants in the
market[.] The freedom to compete implies a right to induce
prospective customers to do business with the actor rather than with
the actor’s competitors. [A seller is permitted] to seek to divert
business not only from competitors generally, but also from a
particular competitor.251

Such diversions and distractions are fair game so long as consumers are
not deceived as to the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of a product or
service.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a person can refer to
another’s trademark so long as consumers are not confused.252 In
Champion Spark Plugs v. Sanders,253 for example, the Court held that a
defendant could sell reconditioned and repaired Champion spark plugs
and mark them as Champion plugs so long as consumers were informed
that the plugs were reconditioned and not distributed by Champion.254
The Court explained that a trademark is an identifier rather than a
property right. Therefore, the use of a competitor’s mark that does not
cause confusion as to source is permissible.255 “When the mark is used

251 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) (emphasis added).
The Restatement of Unfair Competition rejects an earlier position taken in the Restatement of
Torts that suggested an exception from the doctrine of freedom to compete when competition was
motivated by ill will. The new Restatement confirms that ill will is not a basis for a finding of
unfair competition on its own. See also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L.
REV. 1289, 1304 (1940).
252 See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428-29 (2003); Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S.
125, 127, 131 (1947) (holding that company could recondition and sell Champion spark plugs so
long as it indicated that plugs were reconditioned Champion spark plugs, not sponsored by
Champion); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 367-69 (1924) (holding that unaffiliated
company could resell smaller sized bottles of trademark holder’s perfume so long as no one was
misled); Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1910) (holding that competitor would not
commit infringement by selling same product as another company if clearly labeled); Lawrence
Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1891); Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51,
54-56 (1879) (holding that one cannot prevent others from using a mark unless the use misleads
consumers regarding the origin of the product); see also Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th
Cir. 1968) (holding that a company that made perfume that smelled like Chanel No. 5 could
compare its product to the trademarked perfume). Notably, most of these cases preceded the
statutory expansion of trademark protection to include indications of affiliation and sponsorship
as well as of origin. Nevertheless, the conclusions are equally applicable to cases involving
issues of sponsorship or affiliation, so long as consumers are not misled as to such sponsorship or
affiliation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 (1995).
253 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
254 Id. at 126-27, 130-32.
255 Id. at 129; see also Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 380-81 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995), and August
Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995)); New Kids on the Block v. News
Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he fact that [a plaintiff’s trademark is
used to promote] profit and in competition with the trademark holder’s business is beside the
point.”).
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in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the
word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth. It is not taboo.”256
The current trend in district courts and courts of appeal towards
protecting a business’s goodwill through the expansion of the initial
interest confusion doctrine represents a shift in the theoretical
framework of trademark law—from protecting marks only in a limited
set of circumstances, in which consumers are likely to be confused, to a
broader protection more similar to that afforded patent and copyright
holders. Preventing any reference to another’s trademark essentially
conveys a monopoly right to the trademark holder.257 There are a
number of reasons why trademark law should not be read to provide
such a broad property right to trademark holders.
First, Congress, in adopting federal trademark protection, expressly
distinguished trademarks from copyrights and patents and made clear
that trademark protection would be much more limited in scope, and
would not afford monopoly rights or property rights in gross.258 The
distinction is important because in contrast to copyrights and patents,
the registration and protection of trademarks does not require any
demonstration of creativity, originality, or novelty. Therefore, there are
fewer restrictions on what can be trademarked, and it is more likely that
more common words, phrases, symbols, and even colors will be
trademarked and taken out of the public domain. Moreover, patent and
copyright protection exist only for limited times, whereas trademark
protection can be extended indefinitely.259 Thus, the harm to the public
from expanding the scope of trademark protection is substantial.
Second, the creation of trademarks does not involve the same
degree of labor and effort as producing patented and copyrighted works.
Most trademark holders expend more time and energy in advertising
and marketing their products and promoting their trademarks than in
creating the trademark itself. Thus, there is no need to expand the
rewards for the creation of such marks.
Additionally, unlike
copyrighted and patented works, there is no need to further incentivize
the creation of trademarks by expanding the protection afforded to

256 Champion Spark Plugs, 331 U.S. at 129 (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359,
368 (1924) (Holmes, J.)).
257 FTC v. Motion Picture Ad. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); Trainer, 101 U.S. at 54.
258 See supra note 166. While it is true that some protection of trademark rights under the
British Empire and during Roman times conveyed monopoly rights for specific products on
certain favored producers, those monopoly trademark rights were not imported into United States
trademark law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. b (1995).
259 A trademark remains protected if it continues to be in use and to identify a particular
product. Under current trademark law, a trademark owner must file an affidavit of use during the
sixth year after registration and then in every tenth year stating that the trademark is still in use.
The trademark owner must also file a renewal application. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2000).
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them; companies receive sufficient incentives from the market itself to
generate and promote strong marks.260
Finally, in contrast to patent and copyright law, the public plays a
unique participatory role in creating the value and even the
protectability of trademarks.261 Much of the power and strength of
trademarks are created by consumers. Corporations rely on consumers
to create the value in their trademarks. The establishment of trademark
law itself is premised on public participation in the creation of
meaning.262 When evaluating eligibility for trademark protection,
courts, juries and the Patent and Trademark Office look to consumers to
evaluate whether a descriptive trademark has gained secondary
meaning. A descriptive mark generally achieves secondary meaning
only if an appreciable number of consumers recognize the mark and
associate it with a particular product.263 The public also determines
whether a mark has become famous or generic, and whether confusion
is likely.264 Under a labor-reward analysis, the public deserves some
rights to the value that it has created in businesses’ trademarks. Thus,
when evaluating the scope of trademark protection, courts should
consider the public a partial owner of the trademarks at issue. At the
very least, the public, including competing businesses, has earned the
right to use a trademark in non-confusing, non-misleading ways.
2.

Reducing Efficacy of Mark/Trademark Dilution

Another concern courts have tried to remedy through the use of
initial interest confusion is the possible watering down of the strength of
a mark if competitors use it in advertising or to describe their own
unrelated products. This concern forms the basis for state dilution
actions and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). Dilution is
generally defined as the lessening of the capacity of a mark to identify
and distinguish goods and services regardless of competition between
the parties or the likelihood of confusion.265 The appropriateness of
260
261

See Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 399.
See Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1999)
(no other form of intellectual property depends so much on public for its creation).
262 See COOMBE, supra note 229, at 61; see generally Wilf, supra note 261.
263 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). A
descriptive mark can presumptively be considered to have achieved secondary meaning if it
becomes incontestable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000).
264 See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 2 (1988).
265 See Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Sec. 4 Definition, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000); see also
ALA. CODE 1975 § 8-12-17 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1448.01 (2003); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 14330 (West 1987); FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 101-451 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-513 (Michie 2003); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 60 (West
1993); 10 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1530 (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110B § 12
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dilution law itself is controversial,266 although a recent Supreme Court
case decided under the FTDA may suggest that dilution is here to
stay.267 The development of initial interest confusion pre-dated the
adoption of the FTDA and in some instances may have been applied to
remedy problems of dilution.
Concerns over the whittling away of the strength of a mark or the
tarnishment of a mark’s image are best resolved through a dilution
analysis. Dilution applies in situations in which there is no consumer
confusion.268 Because of the potentially broad scope of dilution law,
Congress and the courts have sought to strictly limit dilution actions so
as not to limit more speech than is necessary. For example, the FTDA
is limited to famous marks.269 The Act also explicitly excludes
comparative advertising from its reach so that any tarnishment that
occurs in a comparison advertisement will not be found diluting.270 The
Supreme Court recently held that federal dilution actions can only
succeed if a plaintiff provides evidence of actual dilution; the likelihood
of dilution is not enough.271 This standard is much higher than that
required for showing a likelihood of confusion, and as such is more
speech protective. Applying the initial interest confusion doctrine to
remedy acts that should more appropriately be considered under the
rubric of dilution denies defendants the protections that the dilution
statute and the First Amendment afford them.
3.

Architecture of the Internet

Finally, the proliferation of the initial interest confusion doctrine
has been sparked in recent years by a number of problems unique to the
design of the Internet. The courts’ application of initial interest
confusion on the Internet reflects a degree of activism and impatience
(West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.285 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (1973);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (West 2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-l (McKinney 2005); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1994); 54 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4725-513 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002); W. VA.. CODE § 47-2-13
(2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-101(j), 40-1-115 (Michie 2003).
266 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 24:114; Volokh, supra note 196, at 732-39 (questioning
constitutionality of dilution law); see generally Klieger, supra note 76 (criticizing dilution). But
see Schechter, supra note 63 (calling for adoption of anti-dilution laws).
267 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). I note that Moseley
involved a question of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court has not directly considered
whether the FTDA would withstand a First Amendment challenge.
268 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
269 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
270 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).
271 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34. Congress, however, has recently introduced a bill that would
lower the standard for dilution back to a likelihood of dilution standard. See Trademark Dilution
Revision Act, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005).
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with Congress and the free market to solve some of the problems
emerging from the new technology. Unfortunately, by hastily applying
and expanding trademark law to the Internet context without experience
or knowledge of the medium, many courts have dramatically missed the
mark. For example, numerous courts have repeated the erroneous
proposition from Brookfield that confusion is more likely on the Internet
than offline.272 The rationale for this conclusion is in part that an
Internet user can quickly link or navigate from one website to another.
This speed, however, does not increase confusion; instead, it allows any
confusion to be easily and quickly remedied.
Part of the reason some courts may have missed the mark in the
Internet context is that few members of the bench grew up as part of a
cyber-savvy generation.273 While many jurists have quickly gotten up
to speed, others are not familiar enough with the technology to
accurately assess what a reasonable Internet consumer would experience
when surfing the Web.274 The lack of familiarity with Internet
technology and e-commerce has led to some absurd conclusions about
the Internet in the context of trademark infringement actions: Not only
the faulty assumption that confusion is more likely, but also that finding
information online is more difficult than in the real world, and that
Internet users will easily give up their searches.275 While this may have
been somewhat true with a slow 14k dial-up service, it is less true today
with the frequent use of DSL, cable modem services, Wi-Fi, ISDN, and
T1 lines.276
This last point highlights another fundamental problem with
judicial decision-making in the Internet arena—because the technology
is ever-changing, courts must be careful not to make decisions that fit
only unique and narrow circumstances.277 Instead, courts must look at
the big picture. Generally, a legal principle—especially one as
272 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057
(9th Cir. 1999); Northern Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115 (D.
Mass. 2000); New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d
1430, 1434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
273 The author includes herself in this group—and anyone else who graduated college before
using the Internet, email, and instant messages.
274 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in trademark cases judges often consider the
likelihood of confusion as a question of law rather than of fact.
275 See, e.g., OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (W.D.N.Y.
2000); Planned Parenthood, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1435.
276 A majority of Internet users today have high-speed access, and this number will only
increase, especially with the advent of Wi-Fi access in public spaces, such as coffee shops,
airports and hotels. See John B. Horrigan, Report for Pew Research Organization (April 2004),
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband04.DataMemo.pdf (55% of Internet users now
have broadband at home or at work).
277 Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(“Research involving the Internet may become obsolete in a matter of months.”).
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longstanding and broad-based as trademark law—should be capable of
application to different media without the need to change its
fundamental basis. When an existing and well-established statute or
legal principle cannot address a problem created by a new technology,
and no market solutions are available, it is often a sign that legislative—
rather than judicial—action is required. I will examine two main areas
in which courts have applied initial interest confusion to address
trademark problems on the Internet: domain names and search engines.
a.

Domain Names and Cybersquatting

One problem that has troubled courts is the use of trademarks in
domain names. As with offline businesses, customers need a way to
locate a store. Every site on the web has a unique identification or
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) address. Although this specific
Internet Protocol (IP) address is produced using numbers, it is translated
into plain English to facilitate use by consumers. Most web addresses
use the following format: “http://www.cnn.com.” The domain name is
only the latter half of the address: “cnn.com.” Most domain names end
in “.com,” which is called the top-level domain and is used for most
online businesses.278 The second-level domain is often the name of the
company, here the cable news network, CNN. Domain names are easier
to remember than IP addresses and are considered prized possessions.
Only one business can own a domain name, just as there can only be
one house with a particular address. Thus, the domain name serves a
similar function to a street address or phone number.
There are several potential trademark-related problems that arise in
the domain name context.279 One is the use of a domain name that
includes another company’s trademark when both parties have
legitimate claims to the word used in the domain name. For example,
Clue Computing, a company that provides computer support services,
has a legitimate trademark in its name. Should Hasbro, Inc. be able to
prevent it from using the domain name “clue.com” for its website
simply because Hasbro has a trademarked game called “Clue”? The
First Circuit, one of the few circuits not to adopt the initial interest

278 Other top-level domains include “.edu” for educational institutions, “.gov” for government
organizations, and “.org” for non-profit organizations.
279 My analysis only addresses the issue of potentially infringing uses of trademarks in domain
names, not the issue of whether domain names are separately trademarkable. That issue is
distinct and tends to turn on whether the domain name serves to distinguish a particular product
or service.
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confusion doctrine, said no,280 but other courts have concluded
otherwise in similar circumstances.281
Several courts have applied initial interest confusion in
circumstances in which they are concerned by the potential confusion
caused when a web user incorrectly guesses a domain name for a
website.282 As anyone who regularly uses the Internet knows, guessing
domain names is a risky proposition, and one’s guess may not always
lead to the correct website. The simple fact that consumers may guess
wrong about a website, however, should not be the basis for a trademark
infringement action. When an unsuspecting websurfer types in
“whitehouse.com” instead of “whitehouse.gov” and gets a pornography
site rather than the Oval Office, she is not likely to think that the porn
site is actually the White House or affiliated with the federal
government. Consumers may well be sent to an unintended website, but
that is quite different from being confused as to source, affiliation, or
sponsorship for trademark infringement purposes.283
Guessing the wrong website is similar to misdialing a telephone
number. Courts thus far have held that the adoption of similar vanity
numbers in the hopes of profiting from misdialed numbers is a
legitimate business practice.284 It is possible that if a consumer
accidentally lands on the wrong site, he might settle for a competitor’s
product, but this is a risk any time anyone walks into a store and is
confronted with other purchasing options. Trademark law was not
280
281

Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
See, e.g., Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. mySIMON, Inc., 282 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2002) (online
comparison shopping service could not use web domain www.mysimon.com because plaintiff
had trademark in Simon Property Group, a company that owned shopping malls); Brookfield
Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (defendant could not
use moviebuff.com as website for video rental service, even though it had right to use
“moviebuff” in trademarked slogan, because plaintiff had trademark in “moviebuff” for
entertainment-related database); see also PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d
243, 250-51 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that seller of used trucks could not use plaintiff’s trademark
in domain names); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)
(preventing gripe site with commercial links from using plaintiff’s trademark in website address
because of “initial interest”). But see Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d
1002, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing website operated by Mr. Nissan to continue to operate at
domain “nissan.com”); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir.
2002) (allowing use of trademarked term in domain name where parties were not competitors).
282 See, e.g., PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 250; Brookfield, 174 F.3d 1036, 1044-45; Asia Apparel,
LLC. v. Ripswear, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-469, 2004 WL 3259009, at * 4 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 17, 2004);
OBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81.
283 Network Network v. CBS, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (pointing out
difference between guessing wrong domain site and being confused); Simon Prop., 104 F. Supp.
2d at 1044 (Internet users’ confusion about where to go next is not trademark confusion).
284 See, e.g., Daimlerchrysler A.G. v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2003) (no trademark
infringement when defendant licensed vanity number 1-800-Mercedes); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800
Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 624-26 (6th Cir. 1996) (no trademark infringement despite
frequent misdialing of 1800-H0liday v. 1-800-Holiday and intentional choice of similar number
to profit from misdialed calls).
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meant to protect the most unsophisticated or least intelligent consumers,
but instead to evaluate whether a reasonably prudent potential purchaser
would be confused. There is no doubt that reasonably prudent Internet
shoppers will be aware and prepared for the possibility that their guess
of a domain name will send them to the wrong location. Courts have
also greatly exaggerated the burdens of being led to a different website.
Unlike in the brick and mortar world where one may have gone a
substantial distance to get to a particular store, websurfers can quickly,
in a matter of seconds, redirect their web browser away from the
incorrect site.
In a case that at first glance appears to move away from some of
the Ninth Circuit’s more extreme initial interest confusion decisions, the
Circuit recently allowed a defendant to retain a domain name that used a
famous trademark in it.285 However, on the basis of the initial interest
confusion doctrine, the court severely limited the ability of the
defendant to post advertising on his website. The Ninth Circuit allowed
the defendant, Nissan Computer Corporation, owned by Uzi Nissan, to
continue to use the domain name “nissan.com,” despite Nissan Motor’s
famous trademark in “Nissan.” The court held, however, that Mr.
Nissan could not advertise or provide links to advertisements for cars or
trucks on his website because they would allow him to benefit from
misdirected web traffic.286 This holding unreasonably restricts Mr.
Nissan’s ability to have third-party advertising on his website to help
support his site and business, including advertisements for automobiles.
If ads on Mr. Nissan’s website had suggested that the site was affiliated
or sponsored by Nissan, then they could be enjoined. Absent such a
demonstration of likelihood of confusion, the court overstepped its
bounds by preventing consumers and a business from using online
advertising in circumstances in which there was no confusion.
Some domain name disputes involve circumstances in which a
party without a trademark claim in a domain name reserves a web
address or domain name containing another’s trademark with the intent
to extort payment from the actual trademark holder. This has been
termed “cybersquatting.” One motivation for the expansion of the
initial interest confusion doctrine may have been preventing such
cybersquatting.
In 1999, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA) to remedy the problem of domain name
confusion and cybersquatters.287 The ACPA created a cause of action
against defendants who use another’s trademark (or a confusingly
285
286
287

See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id.
15 U.S.C. §1125 (d)(1)(A) (2000); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5 (1999); Northern
Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115 (D. Mass. 2000).
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similar mark) in a domain name with the bad faith intent to profit from
that use.288 The ACPA has largely solved the cybersquatting problem,
while at the same time adequately protecting the First Amendment
rights of consumers and competitors. Significantly, the ACPA allows
for liability only in circumstances in which a defendant acted with a bad
faith intent to profit from the plaintiff’s goodwill.289 The ACPA
remedies one of the Internet-related problems that may have driven the
misguided expansion of initial interest confusion, without creating the
problems associated with that doctrine.
b.

Online Searches and Metatags

Courts have also used the initial interest confusion doctrine to
solve problems that emerge from the use of search engines. Search
engines act as intelligent agents for web users, searching text and code
online and then sorting results to assist web users in locating
information. Search engines do not have the same cognitive abilities
that human beings have and cannot as easily distinguish between
different trademarks and different uses of trademarks. As folk-rocker
Ani DiFranco sings, “we know the difference between the font of ‘20%
More’ and the font of ‘Teriyaki,’”290 but search engines generally
cannot make such distinctions. Intelligent agents are not and may never
be very good at distinguishing between a slogan saying “this is Coke”
and one saying “this is better than Coke.” Similarly, intelligent agents
cannot evaluate whether a trademark reference constitutes a parody or
other possible fair use. Thus, any framework for resolving online
trademark infringement should not rely on search engines to be the
arbitrators of trademark law.
Most search engines are private businesses that rely on profits to
survive. Therefore, search results are often driven by financial
considerations. A number of companies advise businesses on how to
increase the likelihood of appearing in search results and how to show
up towards the beginning of results lists.291 Sometimes search results
are determined by financial payments to search engines.292 Some search
288
289

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A); see also S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 8 (1999); Interstellar
Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2002). It is important to
distinguish between people willing to be paid to give up a domain name and those who purchased
the domain name seeking to profit by selling it to the trademark holder at the outset.
290 Ani DiFranco, Fuel, on LITTLE PLASTIC CASTLE (Righteous Babe Records 1998).
291 See, e.g., Yahoo! Search Marketing, http://www.overture.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005);
Register Everywhere, Inc., http://www.registereverywhere.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
292 See, e.g., Yahoo! Search Marketing, http://www.content.overture.com/d/USm/ays/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2005); see also Interstellar Starship Servs., 304 F.3d at 945 n.10; Stefanie Olson,
Google
Plans
Trademark
Gambit
(Apr.
13,
2004),
http://news.com.com/
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engines use metatags as a way of locating and sorting search results.
Because some search engines use these metatags as a way of
determining search results, website designers sometimes include
metatags that do not directly describe their website in order to have their
site come up as a search result when consumers look for certain terms
online. An astute competitor might include a trademarked term multiple
times in his metatags and on his website, hoping that his website will
appear higher up in a search results list. The more times a term is
mentioned in a site’s metatags, the more likely that some search engines
will place the website higher in the search results when that term is used
for a search.
Increasingly, however, search engines rely less and less on
metatags as a way of determining search results, and many search
engines discount repeated uses of the same terms.293 Despite the fact
that most search engines no longer use metatags, the bulk of cases
involving initial interest confusion and the Internet consider the use of
metatags. It is therefore important not only to question the validity of
these decisions on their own terms, but also to understand the logic
behind these decisions. These court decisions have been and will
continue to be applied to other situations online in which website
designers, advertisers and search engines seek to control which websites
appear in search result lists when a websurfer enters a trademarked term
as a search term.
As discussed, the Ninth Circuit in Brookfield set the widely
embraced precedent that the use of another’s trademark in the metatags
of a website is infringing.294 Recall that in Brookfield, the defendant,
West Coast, used the term “moviebuff” in the description and keyword
metatags for its video rental store’s website. In describing its holding,
the Brookfield court used an analogy patently inapplicable to the case
and to the Internet. The court likened West Coast’s actions to the
following brick and mortar situation:
Using another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a
sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store. Suppose West
Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts up a billboard on
a highway reading—“West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7”—
where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is
located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast’s store will pull
off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West
Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by the highway
entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer

2100-1038_3-5190324.html.
293 See supra note 41; see also Goldman, supra note 13, at 567 (determining that since 2002
only one major search engine still uses metatags).
294 See discussion supra Part I.C.
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West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching
for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there.295

The court’s analogy is wrong on many levels.296 First, the use of
another’s trademark in metatags is nothing like posting a competitor’s
trademarked name on a sign in front of one’s store. Metatags are never
seen by consumers and, therefore, cannot directly serve to pass off one
person’s good for those of another. Second, West Coast never
suggested that it was Brookfield or that it sold Brookfield’s MovieBuff
database product.297 A more applicable analogy to the actual case
would be a Blockbuster advertisement saying “Blockbuster is the best
videostore on the West Coast. Exit 7.”298
The brick and mortar analogy is also off-base because it
overestimates the difficulty in returning to the Internet Highway. It
takes seconds to click back to a prior webpage or search result list, or to
redirect to another website online, whereas driving off and on the
freeway could take many minutes if not longer. Despite the absurdity of
the freeway analogy, it has spread like wildfire and is cited without
reflection as the basis for finding trademark infringement on the
Internet.299
The Brookfield decision is also highly suspect because the court’s
notion that users were “taken” to West Coast’s website is grossly
inaccurate.300 The use of this language suggests that the panel was
unfamiliar with the Internet and with search engines—users are not
hijacked to particular sites after using a search engine, but instead are
given a list of links which they can then choose to navigate to or not.
Furthermore, as discussed, West Coast’s website was clearly labeled in
the search results, so it was unlikely that anyone went to that website
thinking it was something other than the West Coast Video site.
Since the time of Brookfield, market forces have remedied some of
the courts’ concerns related to online searches. Internet search engines
295 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir.
1999).
296 A number of other scholars have criticized Brookfield’s highway analogy. See, e.g., Dogan
& Lemley, supra note 13, at 815-16; Klein & Glazer, supra note 13, at 1060 (criticizing
Brookfield highway analogy). But see McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters, supra note 12, at
235-36 (complimenting the “nice” billboard hypothetical based on a “metaphor” he had
proposed).
297 The Brookfield court also made much of the fact that West Coast omitted the space
between “movie” and “buff.” This logic again suggests a lack of familiarity with the technology
and with the industry practice. Online search engines do not generally differentiate between
capital letters and lower case ones or between words with and without spaces. Thus, online there
is little difference between “movie buff,” “moviebuff” and “MovieBuff.”
298 Because the motto of West Coast included “movie buff” and “movie buff” is a legitimate
term to associate with a video rental store, use of the term in the metatags and text of the website
should not have been deemed infringing. See discussion infra at Part I.C.
299 See supra note 36.
300 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
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now more clearly label search results and differentiate links from
advertisements or sponsored (or paid) links.301 Some of these changes
are no doubt driven by potential liability, but many of them also make
good business sense because consumers can more easily find what they
are looking for and search engines can profit from companies paying for
the prominent sponsored links and advertisements.
Even though Congress and the market itself have subsequently
solved some of the more troubling problems with the Internet that led to
the expansion of the initial interest confusion doctrine, the courts have
let the genie out of the bottle. Now, speech over the Internet is severely
chilled by the misguided doctrine, and the plethora of Internet-based
initial interest confusion precedents are being used in offline contexts to
hold liable individuals and companies in situations that would not
previously have been actionable.
IV. FAIR USE IS NOT AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION
Some scholars have suggested that the best way to put a stop to the
expansion of trademark protection is to more vigilantly apply fair use in
the trademark context.302 This approach is flawed. First, and most
importantly, it has not worked to date. Despite pleas to broaden the
application of fair use, courts often reject the defense in circumstances
in which it should apply. Even when courts uphold the fair use defense,
their decisions are inconsistent and unpredictable; therefore, defendants
cannot safely rely on the defense.303
Additionally, the fair use defense provided by the Lanham Act
applies only when a trademark is being used in a non-trademark sense
to describe the defendant’s own goods or services.304 The Act provides
a defense when a word is used not as a mark, but as “descriptive of and
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of
such party, or their geographic origins.”305 For example, a vintner with
a trademarked name of Napa Valley Winery could not prevent others
from indicating that their grapes were grown in the Napa Valley region
301 Notably, this was already the case in the Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications
Corp. case, yet the Ninth Circuit found this differentiation to be insufficient. See Playboy Enters.
v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
302 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 423-24 (arguing that broader application of the fair
use defense could remedy expansion of trademark law); cf. LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 217 (relying on fair use to compensate for their proposed
expansion of copyright protection).
303 See Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS.
187, 205 (2004) (describing unpredictable application of fair use defense).
304 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
305 Id.
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of California. The statute does not provide a defense, however, when
reference is made to the trademarked good or service itself. For
example, the defense would not apply to an advertisement that said
“Stag’s Leap’s Cabernet far surpasses that of Napa Valley Winery.”
Therefore, the statutory fair use defense does not resolve the problem in
most initial interest confusion cases because in most cases a defendant
is referring to the trademarked product or service of another rather than
describing its own good.
In some circuits, though not all, the possible fair use defense to
trademark infringement has been expanded beyond the statutory
grounds. As discussed, the statutory fair use defense does not allow the
use of a mark in its trademark sense; therefore, comparison
advertisements, commentary on trademarked goods and services, as
well as objective references to trademarked products, are not protected
by the traditional fair use defense. To remedy this problem, the Ninth
Circuit developed the nominative fair use defense in New Kids on the
Block v. News America Publishing Inc.306 The nominative fair use
defense allows a defendant to “use[] a trademark to describe the
plaintiff’s product, rather than its own.”307 The defense specifically
applies when:
First, the product or service in question [is] one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify
the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that
would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.308

Though a step in the right direction, the nominative fair use
defense is not an adequate remedy to solve the problems created by
initial interest confusion. As an initial matter, not all circuits have
adopted the defense.309 Moreover, there is a dispute over whether
confusing uses can ever be fair uses.310 New Kids explicitly limits
306 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). As Judge Kozinski describes, without being able to use a
trademark, “[m]uch useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if
speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person,
company or product by using its trademark.” Id. at 306-07.
307 Id. at 308.
308 Id.
309 See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“This circuit has never followed the nominative fair use analysis . . . . We are not inclined to
adopt the [nominative fair use analysis] here.”); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns. Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565,
2005 WL 464688, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (“The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has not ruled on the applicability of the nominative fair use defense, nor the standards by which a
claim of nominative fair use should be evaluated.”); Bijur Lubricating Corp. v. Devco Corp., 332
F. Supp. 2d 722, 733-34 n.6 (D.N.J. 2004) (3d Circuit has not addressed issue of nominative fair
use).
310 See MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:11 (if there is a likelihood of confusion, defendant
cannot avail itself of the nominative fair use defense). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in
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nominative fair use to situations in which the public is not deceived.311
The nominative fair use defense, therefore, essentially devolves simply
to a likelihood of confusion analysis. Many of the initial interest
confusion scenarios that I have described involve situations in which
there is no likelihood of confusion; however, because courts have
deemed initial interest confusion to meet the standard of likelihood of
confusion, such cases might be considered deceptive for purposes of
applying New Kids.
The nominative fair use defense has also been repeatedly rejected
in initial interest confusion cases, even in circuits that recognize the
defense. The Brookfield court, for example, rejected a nominative fair
use defense for West Coast’s use of “moviebuff” in its metatags.312 In
Netscape Communications, the Ninth Circuit rejected a nominative fair
use defense because the banner advertisements on a website were not
clearly labeled.313 Most troubling for the usefulness of a nominative fair
use defense in the initial interest confusion context, the Netscape court
suggested that because the advertisers could communicate their message
without keying to Playboy’s trademarked terms, even labeling the
advertisements might not allow for a fair use defense.314 Many courts
have also rejected parody as a fair use defense to trademark
infringement—cabining consideration of parody to the likelihood of
confusion analysis.315 Thus, fair use on its own cannot adequately limit
the excesses of the initial interest confusion doctrine.

KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004), did not decide
the issue. In KP Permanent, the Supreme Court suggested that at least some confusion must be
tolerated in the context of the statutory fair use defense when descriptive marks are at issue. The
Court did not address the validity of the nominative fair use defense or its parameters. Nor did
the Court delineate whether confusion could ever be a basis to defeat a fair use defense.
311 New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
312 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir.
1999); see also Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003); Wells
Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 762-63 (E.D. Mich. 2003). But see
Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
313 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1029-31 (9th Cir. 2004).
314 Id.
315 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (considering parody
as factor in likelihood of confusion analysis, but rejecting parody as affirmative defense to
trademark infringement claim); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 463 (7th
Cir. 2000) (“[A] parody . . . still runs afoul of the trademark laws if it is likely to confuse
consumers.”); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)
(rejecting initial interest confusion doctrine because parody was considered initially confusing);
see also COOMBE, supra note 229, at 75 (not clear that parody is a defense under trademark law);
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 31:154; Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1207(b)(x).
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V. PROPOSED REFORMS
A.

Eliminate Initial Interest Confusion and
Reclaim Pre-Sale Confusion

Courts should reject the initial interest confusion doctrine either by
taking the issue en banc and reversing it, or by not adopting the doctrine
in their circuit. If necessary, the issue should be heard by the Supreme
Court and resolved clearly and decisively. The likelihood of consumers
being distracted, interested, diverted or attracted to another product or
service does not and should not constitute trademark infringement or
unfair competition. Simply put, providing consumers choices should
not form the basis of trademark infringement. The Lanham Act requires
a demonstration that confusion, mistake or deception is likely.
Moreover, as discussed, sound public policy and the framework of
trademark law require a showing of likely confusion before trademark
infringement can be found.
Nevertheless, trademark infringement can and should be found
when consumers are likely to be confused, even if this confusion
precedes the time of sale. As discussed, such confusion harms
consumers and unfairly trades off another’s goodwill through deception.
Such confusion was explicitly made actionable by the 1962
amendments to the Lanham Act.316 To remedy this wrong—without
creating the host of problems inherent in initial interest confusion—
“initial interest confusion” should be eliminated and replaced with the
more precise framework of “pre-sale confusion.” The shift to pre-sale
confusion will clearly establish that simply causing “initial interest”
cannot form the basis of a trademark infringement action.
While some courts that use the term “initial interest confusion” do
limit the action to circumstances in which there is a demonstration of
likely confusion prior to the time of sale, many courts use the term to
mean both pre-sale confusion and initial interest absent likely
confusion.317 Several scholars who have criticized the recent expansion
of the initial interest confusion doctrine have suggested that courts
should simply be more stringent about requiring a showing of the

316 In this respect, the First Circuit is off-base in rejecting trademark infringement in instances
in which likely confusion occurs prior to or after the point of purchase. See, e.g., Astra Pharm.
Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (1st Cir. 1993) (limiting
confusion analysis to time of purchase).
317 See discussion supra Part II; see also RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW § 1:7 (2004) (describing initial interest confusion as trademark
infringement based on “initial interest” that is caused by initial confusion which is later
dispelled); see also Klein & Glazer, supra note 13, at 1035-38 (using initial interest confusion
and pre-sale confusion interchangeably).
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likelihood of confusion.318 For example, Stacey Dogan and Mark
Lemley, in their recent article criticizing a number of cases involving
the use of trademarks on the Internet, maintain that initial interest
confusion remains a “useful lens.” Despite criticizing the application of
the doctrine in specific cases, they ultimately conclude that the law does
not need changing.319 In their minds, courts simply need to do a better
job of applying the likelihood of confusion standard. Although I agree
with many of their criticisms of the application of the doctrine, their
solution of encouraging courts to more stringently apply the existing
likelihood of confusion standard is overly optimistic given the vast
number of precedents decided over several decades that use the term
“initial interest confusion” in circumstances where there is no
confusion. As I have discussed, the term itself is misleading, and courts
will not be able to undo the damage caused by precedents applying the
doctrine without starting anew. Even though initial interest confusion
could be limited to circumstances in which likely confusion is
demonstrated, the best way to stop the doctrinal creep that has resulted
from the use of the term “initial interest” is to completely eliminate it.
The use of the term pre-sale confusion will firmly focus courts’
attention on the likelihood of confusion requirement. As long as the
phrase “initial interest” is thrown into the mix, at least some courts will
be diverted from the confusion requirement. Moreover, establishing a
clearly delineated pre-sale confusion analysis allows the scope of
liability for such confusion to be strictly limited. My recommendations
for limiting pre-sale confusion are discussed below:
1.

Should Consider Only Reasonably Prudent Potential Purchasers

Only confusion as to source, sponsorship or affiliation is actionable
as trademark infringement. Confusion unrelated to the identification
and distinguishing of goods and the companies involved in making or
sponsoring those goods is irrelevant. Even though actionable confusion
can occur both before and after the time of sale, as well as among
individuals who never actually consummate a purchase, consideration
of confusion should be limited to that of potential purchasers.320
This limitation is supported by the legislative history to the 1962
amendment to the Lanham Act, which removed the word “purchasers,”
318 See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 837-38; Cody, supra note 13, at 684-85
(suggesting remedy that courts apply likelihood of confusion factors to initial interest confusion
analysis).
319 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 838.
320 H.R. REP. NO.87-1108, at 4 (1961); see also Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins.
Group, 376 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2004); Elec. Design & Sales v. Elec. Data Sys., 954 F.2d 713, 716
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
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but made clear that it was broadening consideration only to “potential
purchasers,” not to the general population.321 Simply as a policy
matter, courts and juries should only consider potential purchasers.
People who are not likely to buy a particular product or category of
good are much more likely to be confused than potential purchasers.
Furthermore, their confusion is irrelevant because it will not harm them
or the goodwill of the businesses involved.322
When evaluating trademark infringement, courts should focus on
the reasonably prudent potential purchaser.323 In the Internet context,
courts should consider what a reasonable online shopper would think
when faced with an allegedly infringing use. This does not mean that
courts should evaluate only what a professional hacker or computer
science major would think but simply that the first-time Internet user
should not be the litmus test of whether a pop-up ad or search result is
confusing.324 In addition, courts should keep in mind that as users
become more familiar with new technology, it will become less likely
that they will be confused. Crucially, courts should not short-circuit the
likelihood of confusion analysis when analyzing pre-sale confusion.
Instead, they should review all of the factors that normally would be
reviewed if confusion occurred at the time of sale.
2.

De Minimis Pre-Sale Confusion Should not be Actionable

At the outset, it is important to set forth what type of pre-sale
confusion matters. Findings of infringement on the basis of pre-sale
confusion should be limited to circumstances in which there is more
than de minimis confusion.325 Allowing de minimis confusion is
necessary to give competitors sufficient freedom to compete and to
express themselves without fear of liability. Many courts considering
an initial interest confusion theory have rejected the possibility that de
minimis confusion is harmless, and find any, even momentary,
321
322

H.R. REP. NO. 87-1108, at 4.
But see MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:76 (suggesting that the 1962 amendments
broadened the Lanham Act to consider confusion of anyone, including consumers who are not
potential purchasers); 3A ALTMAN, supra note 37, § 21:1 (suggesting that potential confusion of
anyone is actionable).
323 Using a reasonably-prudent-potential-purchaser standard is not a novel suggestion, but
many courts have not applied this standard, especially in the initial interest confusion context.
324 Trademark law protects neither the dimwitted nor the inexperienced. In a situation where
goods are traded among experienced wholesalers, rather than the public at large, one should only
consider whether wholesalers would be confused.
325 The legal term de minimis is short hand for the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex which
“loosely translated [means] that the law does not take notice of, or concern itself, with very small
or trifling matters.” STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 306 (2003).
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confusion a basis for trademark infringement.326 Because making presale confusion actionable greatly expands the circumstances in which
trademark infringement can be found and it is more difficult to assess
than point-of-sale confusion, it is important to limit pre-sale confusion
to circumstances which are more than de minimis. Moreover, in
contrast to point-of-sale confusion, in pre-sale confusion situations there
is time for the confusion to be remedied before there is likely to be a
significant impact on the consumer. De minimis confusion is therefore
not likely to significantly harm consumers or trademark holders.
In evaluating whether pre-sale confusion is merely de minimis,
courts should consider a consumer’s likely expenditure of time and
money as a result of the pre-sale confusion. Of the few courts that have
applied a de minimis confusion analysis in the initial interest confusion
context, most have linked the analysis to situations in which the
“ultimate purchase decision” is not affected.327 But that is a troubling
standard because it punishes fair competition. Once again, it puts the
emphasis solely on business interests rather than on consumers. The
point is not whether a defendant profits from reference to another’s
trademark but whether potential purchasers are likely to be confused.
Moreover, this approach ignores the Lanham Act’s broadening out in
1962 to consider confusion that does not relate to purchasing.
It is true that even de minimis confusion may make it more likely
that a consumer will purchase a defendant’s product because the
consumer may have more positive feelings towards a product due to an
association with the trademark holder’s product.328 It is not easy,
however, to evaluate what affects a consumer’s purchasing choices.
Subliminal reactions should therefore not be actionable.329 Moreover,
de minimis confusion may in fact build interest in a trademark holder’s
product and ultimately be a form of free advertising.330
326 See, e.g, Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1999); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d
on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star Inc., 105 F.
Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also discussion supra Part II.D.
327 See, e.g., Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207-08
(1st Cir. 1983) (holding that temporary confusion in the context of sophisticated purchasers that
was undoubtedly cleared up by the time or purchase was “de minimus”); CCBN.Com. Inc v. CCall.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999) (rejecting infringement claim based on
streetevents.com versus streetfusion.com because confusion was de minimis); see also Sharrock,
supra note 13, at 75-76 (suggesting limiting initial interest confusion to situations in which
ultimate purchasing decision is affected).
328 See generally Gerald M. Kosicki, The Media Priming Effect: News Media and
Considerations Affecting Political Judgments, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 63 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002).
329 See Jennifer Kahn, The Bogus Science of Cool, WIRED, Oct. 2004, at 138, 142 (describing
difficulty in evaluating consumer responses to commercial stimuli when tracked by MRIs).
330 Cf. LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 63, at 153-54 (describing in
copyright context how de minimis quotations of original works increase demand and interest in
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Additionally, to the extent that there is some positive association
made based on de minimis pre-sale confusion, trademark holders have
other avenues to remedy this supposed wrong. To the extent that the
association is very strong, a defendant’s actions may rise to the level of
dilution and be separately actionable under such a theory. For example,
Herbrozac should not be found to infringe Prozac’s trademark, but Eli
Lilly might be able to establish evidence of actual dilution of its mark
because of the similarity of the trade names.331
Limiting actionable confusion to that which is more than de
minimis allows for the use of disclaimers to remedy short-lived pre-sale
confusion. For example, if a websurfer looking for the United Airlines
website accidentally types in “untied.com” instead of “united.com” and
finds herself at a site that criticizes United Airlines and immediately
realizes that she is not at the United site, there should be no pre-sale
confusion action. Her confusion is momentary; she has expended no
money and very little time as a result of the confusion. She can easily
click back and retype her domain name or visit a search engine to find
the proper United site. This should be true even though the Untied site
provides links to airlines that compete with United. Requiring a
showing of more than de minimis confusion maximizes the public good
by narrowly defining trademark protection.
3.

Other Suggested Limits on Doctrine are Flawed

Some courts and scholars have tried to limit the initial interest
confusion doctrine. The suggested restrictions, however, inadequately
protect both consumers and legitimate competitors in the marketplace. I
have already critiqued one such suggestion—the requirement that the
ultimate purchasing decision be affected.332 Another suggested limit on
initial interest confusion is to apply the doctrine only to situations in
which the defendant intended to confuse consumers.333 A recent
decision by the Second Circuit adopted this approach for initial interest
confusion cases involving the Internet.334 The basis for this additional
requirement online is the ease with which “consumers diverted on the
Internet [can] get back on track.”335 There is no statutory or historical

original work).
331 See discussion supra Parts II.B.2.b and III.B.2.
332 See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
333 See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1278-80 (D. Ore.
2001) (limiting initial interest confusion to circumstances involving bad faith (citing Hasbro, Inc.
v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000))).
334 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004).
335 Id.
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basis for adding the requirement of demonstrating intent.336 In fact,
much to the contrary, the statute and legislative history expressly allow
injunctive relief absent a showing of intent. As discussed, consumers
and businesses must be protected even from unintentional deception.
Thus, the added requirement of proving intent is not an acceptable
solution to the excesses of initial interest confusion.337
Some courts and scholars have suggested that when a defendant
does not compete with the plaintiff, initial interest confusion should not
be actionable.338 For example, the Ninth Circuit in Interstellar Starship
Services Ltd. v. Epix Inc.339 held that a defendant could use a plaintiff’s
trademarked term “epix” in its domain name because the two businesses
did not sell competing products.340 The defendant advertised a cabaret
show accompanying a local screening of The Rocky Horror Picture
Show, whereas the plaintiff sold digital imaging products.341 The
Interstellar Starship court suggested that initial interest confusion could
occur only if the two parties were selling competing products.342
The court correctly rejected the application of initial interest
confusion to the facts of the case, but its limitation of trademark
336 Congress wrote in an intent requirement for recovery of economic damages, but not for
injunctive relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(b) (2000). Congress specifically left out of the
Lanham Act the requirement of demonstrating intent, which was an element of the common law
action for deceit.
337 A recent student note suggests that in the Internet context, initial interest confusion should
apply only when there is an intent to “free-rid[e]” on the trademark holder’s business. See
Confusion in Cyberspace, supra note 12, at 2409-10; see also Maynard, supra note 13, at 134950 (suggesting that initial interest confusion be limited to circumstances in which a defendant acts
in bad faith). As I discuss, an intent requirement underprotects consumers and trademark holders.
The note’s suggestion is additionally flawed because it is based solely on a showing of intent to
compete and would prevent lawful competition absent any showing of likely confusion. See
discussion supra Part III.B.1.
338 See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002);
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295-97 (3d Cir. 2001);
see also Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that computer company using word “nissan” in domain name cannot advertise
automobiles without violating trademark rights of Nissan Motor Co.); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc.
v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that confusion is more
likely if a competitor’s website sells similar products); Golden West Fin. v. WMA Mortgage
Servs., No. C 02-05727, 2003 WL 1343019, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2003) (limiting
Brookfield to situation of competitors); Network Network v. CBS, No. CV 98-1349, 2000 WL
362016, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2000); Chatam Int’l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d
549, 558-59 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119-20 (D.
Minn. 2000) (stating that initial interest confusion is only actionable when there is commercial
gain); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13, at 826; Maynard, supra note 13, at 1349; Confusion in
Cyberspace, supra note 12, at 2408-09.
339 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
340 Id. at 943-46.
341 Id. at 938-40.
342 Id. at 943-46. The Interstellar Starship court suggests that the Lanham Act has a
component that requires that a defendant be able to capitalize off misdirecting traffic; however,
nowhere in the Lanham Act is such a requirement set forth. Id. As discussed, the impact on
business is not a direct consideration under the explicit language of the Act.
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infringement to circumstances in which businesses are competing does
not conform with the requirements and purposes of trademark law. The
limiting of initial interest confusion to competitive situations defies
logic because any initial interest confusion would likely precede the
discovery that products were different (i.e., non-competing); therefore
the relatedness of the products is not highly relevant to consumer
confusion. Moreover, because consumers can be misled even when noncompeting goods are involved, limiting actionable confusion to
competitive situations does not adequately protect consumers.
Courts must strike a careful balance between reducing likely
confusion and allowing fair competition; however, it does not make
sense for this balance to turn on the basis of competition itself. Direct
competitors need to be able to mention a competitor’s trademark. Such
comparative advertisements and commentary are necessary for fair
competition, promotion of consumer interests and free speech. At the
same time, confusion caused by non-competitors should be actionable
because it may harm consumers. For example, suppose a company
named itself Sony and started selling cars under that name. A consumer
might be more inclined to purchase a car from Sony, mistakenly
thinking that the car was manufactured by the Sony that makes first-rate
electronics. This confusion should be actionable if consumers are likely
to be confused even if the famous Sony Corporation does not sell cars
and will, therefore, not lose any money from the confusion. Why?
Because the consumer’s confusion may have led him to buy a car he
otherwise might not have bought. The limitation of initial interest
confusion to competing situations again demonstrates the misguided
focus on producers rather than consumers when analyzing trademark
claims. Moreover, to the extent that the competitive proximity of two
products or services increases the likelihood of confusion, such
competitive proximity is already considered as part of the traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis.
Applying the proposed pre-sale confusion doctrine would remedy
the troubling outcomes in a host of cases that have applied the initial
interest confusion doctrine. West Coast would not have been held liable
for trademark infringement for using “moviebuff” in its metatags.
Natural Answers would not have committed trademark infringement for
using Herbrozac to name its natural anti-depressant. Penguin Books
would not have infringed Dr. Seuss’s mark with its book The Cat Not in
the Hat. In each of these instances there was no likelihood of
confusion. Under the pre-sale confusion doctrine, absent such a
showing, trademark infringement could not be found.
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Pre-Sale Confusion Analysis Applies Equally to the Internet

The pre-sale confusion doctrine does not require special rules for
the Internet. The bulk of commentators that have criticized initial
interest confusion have suggested that it should not apply online or that
different rules should apply to the Internet.343 As a general principle, I
reject the notion that laws, especially long-standing tort and intellectual
property laws, need to be changed when applied to a new medium.344 It
is true that when a new medium presents itself courts are often
presented with novel facts and circumstances that result in different
outcomes, but the likelihood of confusion test works equally well online
and offline. The pre-sale confusion doctrine would apply with equal
force, and without need for alteration, to the Internet.
For example, in evaluating the question of whether using another’s
trademarks in metatags can ever be confusing, current trademark law
and the pre-sale confusion doctrine provide sufficient answers. While
many scholars to date have treated the metatag question as an all-ornone question,345 the answer depends on the specifics of the use of the
mark in the metatags. Where courts have gone astray is not in holding
that the use of trademarks in metatags can be confusing, but in holding
that such uses are always confusing. Because search engines, using
both humans and intelligent agents, search the web and provide search
results upon which consumers rely, there is a convincing argument that
the use of metatags that deceive search engines should constitute
trademark infringement even though most consumers do not see the
tags. If words used in the keyword or description metatags do not
accurately describe those websites, then they are deceptive and may
provide grounds for trademark infringement. If the metatags fairly
describe the website or the category of product, however, then they

343
344

See supra note 13.
See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 283, 331 (2001); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003)
(questioning why Congress chose to change traditional defamation in online context). But see
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 31:152 (suggesting that medium is key to determining
infringement); BIEGEL, supra note 325, at 25-49 (discussing different approaches to applying the
law on the Internet).
345 See, e.g., Bakken, supra note 13, at 27-28 (suggesting that metatags are not confusing
because consumers do not see them); Yelena Dunaevsky, Comment, Don’t Confuse Metatags
with Initial Interest Confusion, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 1378 (2002) (same); Kurt M.
Saunders, Confusion is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner Advertising, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 552-57 (2002) (suggesting that absent fair use defense, use of another’s
trademark in metatags is confusing); Rachel Jane Posner, Note, Manipulative Metatagging,
Search Engine Baiting & Initial Interest Confusion, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439, 505
(2000) (agreeing with Brookfield that use of another’s trademark in metatag is infringing).
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should not constitute trademark infringement even if a defendant uses
another’s trademark in the tags.
In the Brookfield case, West Coast should not have been held liable
for using “moviebuff” to describe its website. Its trademarked slogan
included the word “movie buff,” a generic term for a movie enthusiast;
thus, there is nothing deceptive or confusing about describing its site
with a metatag using the word “moviebuff.” Similarly, Garcia should
be able to use the term “Pycnogenol” in the metatags for his website
selling the identical herbal supplement under the brand name
Masquelier. The use of the term “Pycnogenol” accurately describes the
website because Masquelier is a similar product to Pycnogenol and
consumers should be able to compare them. The description is also
accurate because Pycnogenol is the name used in the scientific studies
of the product and the product is sold under that trademark in Europe
and other countries.
When a metatag misrepresents a website, this deception should be
used as evidence of likely confusion. For example, in Niton Corp. v.
Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc.,346 the defendant, Radiation
Monitoring, copied all of the plaintiff’s metatags and used them for its
own website. Those metatags were deceptive because they included
terms that had no relevance to Radiation’s own website or products.
One of the listed keywords was “radon,” something neither used in
Radiation’s products nor referred to in the website. Most significantly,
Radiation described itself in its source code as the “Home Page of Niton
Corporation.”347 These tags do not accurately describe the site or
product of Radiation and are likely to cause confusion as to source,
sponsorship, or affiliation. Thus, under the pre-sale confusion doctrine
likely confusion would be found. If this confusion were not de minimis,
i.e., quickly resolved upon landing on the website, it would be
actionable infringement. Because of Radiation’s claim that it was the
home page for Niton, there is a likelihood that such pre-sale confusion
would not quickly be remedied because websurfers would likely be
convinced that they had chosen the correct site for Niton.
Other Internet-based trademark questions have and will arise (such
as pop-up ads, keyed advertisements, deep-linking, and framing)348 and
346
347
348

27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998).
Id. at 104.
I have already discussed pop-up ads and banner ads. Deep-linking arises when one website
takes you to another website but skips the home page of the website and perhaps several other
pages that a websurfer would normally have to go through if he accessed a website directly. An
example of deep-linking follows: suppose I go to Usher’s website to buy tickets for one of his
concerts and click on a link saying “buy tickets for the Los Angeles concert date,” and am then
taken to the Ticketmaster website and the exact page where one can buy tickets for this concert.
By deeplinking me to this page, Usher’s website has allowed me to bypass many webpages of the
Ticketmaster site, and probably numerous paid advertisements that Ticketmaster had hoped I
would read. Under the pre-sale confusion test, so long as I know that I’m at the Ticketmaster
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they can all be resolved using the pre-sale confusion and likelihood of
confusion tests. Thus, the pre-sale confusion test works equally well in
both online and offline situations and allows fair competition consistent
with the requirements of the First Amendment, the Lanham Act, the
policies underlying trademark protection, and other intellectual property
laws.
C.

Structural Changes to the Internet

Even with the application of the pre-sale confusion doctrine, there
may still be some instances online in which a trademark holder’s
website gets buried in search results. This problem should not be
remedied by expanding legal doctrine or legislation, but instead by
making some structural changes to webpage design and search engine
algorithms. Such changes will likely come about naturally through
market forces. These changes will be superior to judicial and
congressional second-guessing because Internet businesses can adapt
much more rapidly to evolving technology. It is not the role of
trademark law to solve every possible business problem for trademark
holders.
Many Internet-related issues confronting courts such as banner
advertisements, keyed advertisements, the use of metatags, and the
order and content of search results are products of the way search
engines work. Several possible structural changes to webpages and
search engine algorithms could remedy some of these problems. For
example, search engines could require web designers to use source code
that identifies a “Trademark Metatag.”349 The Trademark Metatag
would identify the trademark name of the owner or sponsor of a
website. Only the lawful trademark holder would be able to use the
trademark in the Trademark Metatag. Search results could then be

website when I buy my tickets there is no likely confusion. If I thought I was buying them from
Usher then there could be actionable confusion.
Framing occurs when one website links to another but frames the new website with its own
advertising or text. The standard likelihood of confusion and pre-sale confusion analyses can
resolve such cases.
349 I am not the first to make such a proposal. Dan McCuaig also suggested such a solution in
his article, Halve the Baby: An Obvious Solution to the Troubling Use of Trademarks as
Metatags, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 643 (2000). Despite McCuaig’s suggestion
that the solution was “obvious,” it has not been undertaken five years later. Given the changing
legal climate, there may be more interest in the suggestion today. Another possible solution
proposed by James A. Rossi is to add another top level domain for trademark holders. See Rossi,
supra note 12, at 348. This is a good idea, but will have problems when there are two legitimate
trademark holders and will not address the use of trademarks in the metatags or websites of
competitors or non-competitors.
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organized with the trademark results separated out from the other
results.
Search engines and trademark holders have a strong incentive to
put such a system in place. Consumers who are looking for the website
of the trademark owner will prefer to have that result at the top of the
list, and the trademark holder would obviously benefit as well. Some
search engines could provide consumers a choice—Google could have a
box that you check if you want only results with trademark holders of
the term you entered. For example, if I only wanted the official iTunes
website, I could check the box, but if I wanted to see other services I
could do a broader-based search. Using the Trademark Metatag would
protect trademark holders, but it would also benefit consumers by
allowing websurfers to compare similar products and review
commentaries about trademarked products. This result best promotes
fair competition, free speech, and the public interest. The use of the
Trademark Metatag would be enforced by the traditional likelihood of
confusion analysis. If a non-trademark holder used a trademark in its
Trademark Metatag, that would be grounds for a finding of either
trademark infringement or unfair competition. Because such a use
would likely be in bad faith, a defendant would be liable for damages.
Because search engines are more useful the more relevant their
results are, there is an incentive for search engines to continually work
to improve the algorithms they use to sort search results. Search engine
technology will continually evolve—search engines are the yellow
pages and card catalogues of the 21st Century—and courts and
Congress should give them a wide berth to develop and improve rather
than burdening the system with extensive liability and legislation.
CONCLUSION
The expansion of trademarks in recent years in a variety of areas
makes the need to reign in the initial interest confusion doctrine even
more pressing. As several scholars have noted, trademarks have
increasingly become entities separate and apart from particular goods
and services.350 Trademark infringement actions used to be limited to

350 See Litman, Breakfast for Batman, supra note 63, at 1721-25 (describing variety of ways in
which there has been a vast expansion of trademark protection); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999); see generally
Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, supra note 63; Dreyfuss, supra note 63.
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situations in which a defendant used a plaintiff’s trademark to identify
the origin of its counterfeit good. The shift towards treating the value of
trademarks as something separate and apart from any indication of
origin, or even of a particular product, greatly broadens the conduct that
can be blocked by infringement actions. As such, trademarks are
rapidly approaching property rights in gross. Each trademark holder has
an incentive to push its trademark protections as far as they will go. It
is the duty of Congress and the courts to vigilantly guard against such
excesses and to protect both the public and the free market system from
such aggressive efforts.
Initial interest confusion is such an excess, and one which, despite
violating the express terms of the Lanham Act, thus far has been
extremely successful. It is time for courts to revisit the doctrine. Each
court of appeals has the ability to reject initial interest confusion and to
embrace in its place the more limited analysis of “pre-sale confusion”—
according to the guidelines set forth above—carefully limiting
actionable pre-sale confusion to situations in which there is likely
confusion by reasonably prudent potential purchasers that exists prior to
the time of sale and such confusion is more than de minimis.
Congress should also take heed of the policy reasons why we
should not punish “initial interest” absent likely confusion. Even if
courts do eliminate the errant initial interest confusion doctrine, it is
likely that powerful trademark holders will try to codify the doctrine
back into the law. In recent years, Congress has been heavily lobbied
by some of the most powerful intellectual property groups and has
codified more and more expansions of intellectual property laws at the
expense of the public and smaller businesses. Such efforts should be
rebuffed with regard to initial interest confusion since the doctrine flies
in the face of the justifications for trademark protection and the Lanham
Act, and raises serious conflicts with the First Amendment and other
intellectual property laws.
In the years ahead, important choices will be made about how we
want the Internet to look and how we shape business conducted online.
At the same time, we are at a crucial juncture in trademark law in which
courts and Congress will need to decide what role the consideration of
consumers plays in determining the scope of trademark rights.
Trademark law was never meant to be a property grant to individual
trademark holders; rather, the protection of trademarks requires a
careful balance of the interests of trademark holders, competitors and
the public. The history of trademark protection in this country
persuasively demonstrates that courts should consider the public welfare
rather than an individual corporation’s profits when evaluating
trademark infringement actions. Replacing the initial interest confusion
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doctrine is one critical step in the direction of reclaiming the public’s
rightful place in trademark law.

